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This research conducts foreign policy analysis through the frameworks of 
national identity and grand strategy. The research focuses on Russian and Chinese 
foreign policy in Central Asia from the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991 to recent 
times. The analysis of each case is conducted in chronological order and divided 
into three periods. Each period focuses on security, economic, energy and 
institution building policies. The research uses qualitative case study approach, 
which comprises exploratory, explanatory and descriptive typologies.  
Primary aim of this research is to explain foreign policy of Russia and 
China in Central Asia during the last two decades. This choice stems from 
understanding the two countries’ proximity to the region, as well as the 
assumption that these states are most influential neighbors of Central Asia. 
Analysis of foreign policies of third parties involved in the region will offer better 
understanding of these individual states’ behavior in Central Asia and help 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Great powers have had strong attraction and interest in Central Asian 
region. By the end of 19th century, Central Asia found itself between Tsarist 
Russia and British Empire. For Tsarist Russia, this region represented a ground 
for quest from declining Persian Empire and weak Turkmen tribes. Meanwhile, to 
the British Empire, Afghanistan and small Central Asian states (khanates) 
represented a buffer zone to defense northern borders of India and secure access 
to Persian Gulf. Thus, the competition between two powers or so-called “Great 
game” has influenced the region over past century. 
Since the fall of Soviet Union in 1991, Central Asia has been tackling with 
challenges coming from within, as well as outside of the region. During the past 
two decades due to region’s growing geopolitical importance, the “ New Great 
Game” replaced the old appellation, “Great Game”. With a population of 60 
million, significant oil and gas reserves and central position between China, 
Russia and the Caspian States, Central Asia is a pivotal crossroad and strategically 
important for power seeking states in the Asian hemisphere (Blank, 2010).  
Since the collapse of Soviet Union Central Asia has passed through 
significant geopolitical shifts and changes. In 2001 with the launch of Global War 
on Terror (GWOT) in Afghanistan, this region became of vital interest to the US-
led Western coalition. Later, in 2005 region Central Asia witnessed “color 
revolutions” and political turmoil. Since 2001, China and Russia have made 
important strides in Central Asia with the establishment of the Shanghai 
	 2 
Cooperation Organization, which is usually regarded as anti-Western alliance. 
Russia, which perceives Central Asia as its own sphere of interests, has been 
attempting to re-gain its positions in this region by launching its own projects of 
integration (Customs Union, Eurasian Economic Unity). China also has 
confidently improved its links with CA, particularly in security and economic 
spheres, by promoting its own plans such as Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB). 
Afghanistan, which lies to the south of the region, is still in the war between 
national minorities and radical groups. This country is politically weak and poses 
threats to the region such as terrorism and spread of radical Islam. Some other 
states such as Turkey, European Union, India and Japan also stepped up their 
engagement with the region. In general, many experts regard these cases as the 
result of rivalry between involved states. They simply highlight these 
relationships as newly appeared “Great game”, which traditionally was used to 
describe rivalry between Russian and British empires in nineteenth century and 
assume that comparing to the situation in nineteenth century, current “New great 
game” involves much more players (Mullerson 2009, Blank 2010, Kim & Indeo, 
2013). In other words, Central Asia has become space of engagement for external 
powers, seeking their own interests and motivations in this region. At the same 
time, experts consider Central Asia unstable due to a number of intra-regional 
problems such as weak cooperation in the region. As one report has pointed there 
are problems such as absence of political will among local states to consolidate 
their approaches towards cooperation, lack of accountability in public-decision-
making and high levels of corruption (Linn, 2012). Now the region is the object of 
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interest of many scholars and experts specializing both in world politics and in 
regional issues. 
Study of world politics and foreign policy of states are main concerns of 
International Relations (IR) discipline. Understanding world politics is core issue 
of systemic approach, while the study of foreign policy of actors is unit-level 
perspective. Yet, both perspectives explain causes of conflicts and wars or 
cooperation in world politics and predict how to maintain peace within 
international community. Both perspectives agree that states are main decision-
makers and unitary actors in the system; hence, the patterns of IR depend on 
nature of international system as well as behavior or foreign policy choices of 
states. 
There are three main theoretical schools, which explain world politics from 
different perspectives. One of them is theory of realism. Realism assumes that 
there is no supranational body, which controls the nature of relationships between 
states, and therefore international system where states act is anarchic (Waltz, 
1979). Anarchy of the system is naturally predetermined and implies that state 
preserves its security in a “self-help” manner, which means that state must rely on 
its own material capabilities. International politics is anarchical, and anarchy is 
permissive cause of war (Waltz, 1979). Under such assumptions realists argue that 
power distribution in the system is core element of world politics, and changes in 
power distribution causes changes or conflicts in international system (Waltz, 
1979). Realism has developed several strands such as offensive and defensive 
realism. According to defensive realists, “First concern of states is not to 
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maximize power, but to maintain their position in the system (Waltz, 1979). In 
general, defensive realism claims that international system does not necessarily 
engender conflicts or war, and defensive strategy is the best way to maintain 
security (Lynn-Jones, 1998). In contrast, offensive realists argue that states tend to 
maximize their capabilities because (a) state’s primary objective is to survive (b) 
states are never certain about other actors’ intentions, and (c) states inherently 
possess military capability, which can be used to destroy each other 
(Mearsheimer, 2001). This strand of realism maintains that anarchy stimulates 
aggression; insufficient security in the system provokes war and conflict (Lynn-
Jones, 1998). 
Meantime, for both strands, “relative power” of states is central to maintain 
their security. States improve their relative power over other states through three 
ways. The first is “internal balancing”, which means that state improves its 
capability by spending more resources on military power (Waltz, 1979). Second 
way refers to “external balancing” or when state joins alliances to balance 
potential threat (Waltz, 1979). Finally, “military conflicts” through which state 
seeks to strengthen itself or weaken its potential opponent (Mearsheimer, 2001). 
Another theoretical camp of IR is liberalism or idealism. Liberalism has 
become grand theory of IR when realism was unsatisfactory to explain growing 
institutional cooperation in world politics during post-Cold War era (Weber, 
2010). Liberalism maintains that fundamental actors in politics are members of 
domestic society – individuals or groups that pursue their own interests 
(Moravcsik, 1997). Unlike realism that sees “relative gains” as primary 
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motivation of states, liberalism maintains that international institutions generate 
cooperation, which provides states with “absolute gains” (Keohane & Martin, 
1995). Liberals reject realist assumption that state policy is foremost driven by 
actor’s relative stance in international order. Rather liberals assert that individuals 
measure their gains and losses from state’s foreign policy and further support of 
foreign policy initiatives, governmental institutions and survival of the state 
fundamentally depends on nature of individual preferences (Moravcsik, 1997). In 
other words, liberalism believes that “international community – a formal or 
informal collective and cooperative set of social relationships among sovereign 
nation-states – may be an alternative to world government and alternative to 
international anarchy (Weber 2010, p.38). Liberalism also has several strands. 
One of them is institutional liberalism, which believes that states can cooperate 
with each other economically, even though they act in the system, which implies 
competition in terms of security. Economic cooperation can generate 
interdependence between states, and such interdependence brings mutual benefits 
for each side engaged, thereby minimizing the risk of war and maintaining peace 
between actors (Keohane & Martin, 1995). However, in the process of 
coordination choices states face problem as which of the outcomes is preferable 
for each side, because every choice has various distributional power. In such 
situations where disagreement generates barriers to cooperation, institutions are 
helpful as they provide framework that “makes particular cooperative outcomes 
prominent” (Keohane & Martin 1995, p.45). Thus, international institutions make 
cooperation between states more likely, when actors face problem in coordinating 
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their choice on particular cooperative outcomes (Keohane & Martin, 1995). 
Another brand of liberalism is the theory of hegemonic stability. This theory 
asserts that stability and peace in international system is maintained by hegemonic 
power, which possesses more economic and military capabilities than other 
actors. A hegemon state can maintain economic stability through setting agenda in 
international institutions and by sharing public goods, which are beneficial for all 
other states (Kupchan & Ikenberry, 1990). As Gilpin points “Without a hegemon, 
international cooperation in trade, monetary, and most other matters in 
international affairs becomes exceptionally difficult, if not impossible, to achieve 
(Gilpin 2001, p.94). The hegemony is based on international cooperation, not 
coercion and to maintain stability in the system, a hegemon state must be 
committed to liberal economic principles such as market economy and 
liberalization of international trade (Gilpin, 2001). 
Finally, for the theory of constructivism principal element of international 
system is identity of states. In contrast to realists, constructivists assert that the 
nature of international system is not predetermined, rather its nature changes 
according to the pattern of interaction between various identities (Wendt, 1992). 
Constructivists also believe that state’s interests are endogenous to its identity, 
therefore their interests in international system are shaped by their identities 
(Hopf, 2002). Likewise above-mentioned theories, constructivist approach also 
has its strands namely “systemic”, “unit-level” and “holistic”. Discussion of 
constructivism is provided in details in Chapter 2 of this paper. 
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1.1. Statement of the problems 
Majority of the existent literature tends to view Central Asia as the region, 
which is covered by competition or rivalry between external powers. The authors 
belonging to this camp argue that major powers have conflicting views and are 
bound to involve in this region in order to prevent their rivals from gaining 
relative benefits while dealing with region. Therefore, scholars and experts 
assume that current international relations in this region are “zero-sum game”. For 
instance, the argument goes that Russia became cautious about China’s growing 
influence in Central Asia and therefore Moscow supported the enlargement of the 
SCO by inviting new members (India, Iran). Moscow assumed that such 
expansion was opportunity for Moscow to increase its role in Central Asia thereby 
limiting that of Beijing (Kim & Indeo, 2013). Another example shows that in 
order to balance potential losses from Moscow’s actions, Beijing used its 
economic advantage in the region thereby pulling Central Asia into China’s orbit 
of influence (Dittmer, 2007). Meantime, some experts called this region as 
“laboratory for Chinese foreign policy” (as cited in Kim & Indeo 2013, p.277). 
They explain that Central Asia is a space where major powers such the US, Russia 
and China check each-others’ relative influence (Kim & Blank, 2013). At times 
when Russia felt its influence was diminishing relatively to China, Moscow 
assumed closer relationships with Western powers in Central Asia. Similarly, 
when the US became power broker in Central Asia during early 2000s, both 
Russia and China reached strategic convergence to constrain Washington in the 
region. In 2005, Sino-Russian strategic convergence in CA reached its peak and 
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was able to limit Washington’s role by restoring status quo in the region. Another 
recent study also has found that Central Asia is still a space of “zero-sum 
competition” because “relentless expansion of China’s footprint in the region has 
come largely at the expense of Russia’s influence” (Rumer et al 2016, p.11). 
Although such views are convincing, broad implication that region is under “zero-
sum” competition may lead to certain omissions. Some scholars have pointed that 
“realists interpret the relative-gains logic as showing that states will not cooperate 
with one another if each suspects that its potential partners are gaining more from 
cooperation than it is” (Keohane & Martin 1995, p.45). One may consider an 
important point that “zero-sum” approach mostly explores rivalry between 
involved states and therefore simply omits the explanation of driving factors, 
main features and patterns of their foreign policies. Another counter-argument is 
that traditional “zero-sum” approach ignores co-operative patterns of relationships 
among involved parties and fails to suggest local countries in CA how to 
cooperate with external players in the region.  
Primary aim of this research is to explain foreign policy of Russia and 
China in Central Asia during the last two decades. This choice stems from 
understanding the two countries’ proximity to the region, as well as the 
assumption that these states are most influential neighbors of Central Asia. 
Analysis of foreign policies of third parties involved in this region will lead us to 
better understanding of these individual states’ behavior in CA and help explore 
new patterns of relationships that are simply shadowed by geopolitically driven 
approaches. 
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1.2. Significance of the research 
As previous section notes, there have been many discussions on 
international relations in Central Asia and they tend to see ongoing relations in the 
region as “zero-sum” between major powers. These discussions look at Central 
Asia from systemic-level perspective and therefore place Central Asia at the 
center of triangle or within Russia-China-US rivalry. However, there is a lack of 
study, which provides detailed explanation about individual states’ foreign policy 
in Central Asia. This research makes a contribution to the “unit-level” body of 
analysis by studying and exploring foreign policy in the case of Russia and China. 
This study is important for several reasons. First, given the argument that 
“…Central Asia is once more a key to security of all Eurasia” (Starr, 1996), it is 
important to understand what major powers seek in this region and what are their 
motivations beyond “geopolitical rivalry”. In this sense, the research offers 
explanation and chronological observation of foreign policy of Russia and China 
– two closest and seemingly most influential powers in Central Asia. Second, 
Central Asia is home to five countries that have no prior independent statehood in 
current order and this fact requires more expertise in foreign policy analysis. 
Thus, comprehension of Russia and China’s actions in Central Asia will improve 
the process of decision-making while dealing with these unitary actors and 
provide knowledge on improving relationships between the region and the two 
countries. 
1.3. Research questions 
This work conducts analysis of Russian and Chinese foreign policy towards 
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Central Asia since the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991. To do so the research 
examines following questions and sub-questions: 
Main questions: What are driving factors of Russian and Chinese foreign 
policies towards Central Asia? Why Central Asia is important for these countries? 
Sub-questions: 
Have foreign policies of these countries changed? If so, what were reasons 
for these changes and in what context these changes did happen. 
What are the main interests of these countries in Central Asia? 
What are the main instruments that Russia and China have been employing 
to realize their foreign policies in Central Asia? 
1.4. Research objectives 
This research explains basic features of Russian and Chinese foreign 
policies in CA since the disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991. The research is 
designed to identify and compare drivers of foreign policy that have been pursued 
by Russia and China in CA since the independence of this region. Moreover, each 
country’s engagement in CA is divided into three main periods, which cover 
discussion of various variables such as security, economic and institutional issues 
that were present in their foreign policies in CA within the last two decades. By 
such periodization, the research also identifies factors associated with shifts and 
changes within each period of foreign policies of the two countries in CA. 
1.5. Research methodology 
To answer its questions this research used qualitative case study method. 
The choice of the two cases – Russia and China, comes from understanding that 
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both Russia and China are most proximate countries to the region, as well as 
assumption that these states are seemingly the most active and influential ones in 
CA. This work is qualitative empirical research. The study of each country’s 
foreign policy in Central Asia is conducted in chronological manner by applying 
multiple frameworks for each state. The reason for employing multiple 
approaches is the insufficiency of single framework that can explain shifts and 
evolution in foreign policies of these countries. The research also used some 
secondary statistical data to explain patterns of economic policy of the two 
countries in Central Asia.  
Yin (2014) notes that choosing research methodology depends mostly on 
the nature of question(s) that study intends to answer and distinguishes three main 
features of case study analysis: (a) main questions of the case study are “how” and 
“why” questions; (b) a researcher has little or no influence over behavioral events; 
(c) the research should focus on contemporarily event. According to the number 
of cases that researcher wants to examine, there are single or multiple case studies 
(Yin, 2014). In terms of research purposes, case studies have three categories: 
exploratory, descriptive and explanatory types (Yin, 2014). 
Case study approaches do not necessarily mean that research is strictly 
linked to “how” and “why” questions. Although the nature of “what” questions 
imply more to either survey or archival studies, case study approach may also 
have “what” question as its main inquiry, and the researcher may employ 
“exploratory case study” approach (Yin, 2014). Exploratory case study helps to 
investigate any problem in the data by asking general questions, which create a 
	 12 
specific interest for researcher (Zaidah, 2007). Asking general questions will lead 
researcher for deeper and closer examination of initially observed phenomena 
(Zaidah, 2007). The main question of this research is what drive(s) foreign policy 
of Russia and China in Central Asia and therefore this study employs exploratory 
method of case study. 
This work also examines how and why questions by establishing 
chronological order. These questions are inquiries of explanatory case studies. 
This type of case study investigates the data closely, in deep level to explain 
problems appeared in data (Zaidah, 2007). As Yin (2014, p.10) notes “why” and 
“how” questions are “more explanatory and likely to lead to the use of case study 
research method… and such questions will deal with operational links to be traced 
over time”. In this sense, this research established chronological order to create 
links with contemporary issues and explain these ongoing issues. 
Third type of case studies is descriptive approach. This type helps to 
describe any phenomenon that occurs within collected data (Zaidah, 2007). 
Descriptive case study allows the researcher to study single or multiple cases by 
closely analyzing data within the specific context and relate these cases to a 
theoretical framework (Mikkelsen, 2005). As such the context of this research is 
twofold. The first is periodization i.e. the research studies foreign policy of the 
two countries during last two decades since the collapse of Soviet Union and 
covers security, energy, economic and institution building policies. Second is 
theoretical framework i.e. constructivist and grand strategy theories. For instance, 
the analysis of Russian foreign policy in CA employed the notion of “national 
	 13 
identity”, which falls under constructivist framework of International Relations 
(IR) theories. In case of China, the research explained China’s foreign policy in 
CA by applying “grand strategy” perspective. 
There are some features that distinguish case study from other approaches. 
One of them is that the researcher has little or no influence over behavioral events. 
Compared to historical researches, case studies may use two additional sources of 
evidence that are not available for historical studies: direct observation of events 
and interviewing participants (Yin, 2014). In addition, the situations where 
researcher may have control over events or variables are laboratory or fieldwork 
studies (Yin, 2014). This study did not use any of these evidences, and therefore 
the researcher had no influence on the behavioral events. Final characteristic of 
case studies are contemporary issues. As mentioned earlier, objectives of this is 
foreign policy analysis, which is ongoing process. 
Meantime, case study analysis has some disadvantages. Common criticism 
is that since case study method includes small number of cases, it prevents the 
research to make generalizing conclusions. In this sense, conclusions made from 
the examination of two cases cannot be generalized in respect to other states’ 
foreign policies. 
The researcher used online data collection, which included various materials 
such as monographs, academic journals and publications of research centers. The 
research also benefited from interviews of experts and scholars on Central Asian 
issues conducted by some research centers. In order to find out the patterns of 
economic cooperation between CA and these countries, this work also included a 
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set of statistics from sources published in Russian language. 
1.6. Limitations of the research 
Although the objective of this study – to identify basic characteristics of 
Russian and Chinese foreign policies in Central Asia, might be considered more 
general, the data collected during this research gives the researcher clear idea 
about some aspects, which need further detailed examination. Among these are 
bilateral relations of Central Asian countries with Russia or China. The study of 
bilateral relations was beyond the scope of this research due to the difference in 
analytical frameworks. In this sense, the study of bilateral relations gives 
opportunities for further research.  
Another limitation of this research is case study framework. Although it was 
helpful to fulfill the study, conclusions of this research are not generalizable and 
cannot be adapted to some other countries such as Iran or Turkey, although 
Central Asian neighbors, yet with lesser influence compared to Russia or China. 
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURES 
This chapter appears through three main sections. The first two sections 
describe existing literature related to Russian and Chinese foreign policy, 
respectively, while the last section reviews other body of literature, which 
concentrates mostly on international relations in CA. 
2.1. National Identity: Russia and its foreign policy in Central Asia 
Identity is central variable of constructivist perspective of IR. 
Constructivism has three main streams, and the notion of identity is main criteria 
for each strand. The first stream is “systemic” approach, and mostly focuses on 
interactions between state actors and explains changes in the system as the result 
of various identity interactions. Wendt (1992) claims that “Anarchy is simply 
what states make of it”, i.e. the nature of anarchy is not naturally competitive, but 
its nature changes according to how unitary actors see themselves with the respect 
to others. The meanings from which state’s actions are organized rise out from the 
interaction of Self and Other (Wendt, 1992). This argument is built upon two 
considerations: first, social structures that involve human association are 
established by shared views rather than material forces; second, interests and 
identities of actors are not given by nature, instead they are based on these shared 
ideas (Wendt, 1999). Thus, it is state identity, which determines whether states 
see each other as allies or enemies thereby altering power differences within the 
system (Nau, 2003). 
Second stream of constructivism is “unit-level” approach. This line of 
constructivism concentrates on political realm within the state or how state’s 
	 16 
domestic policy (domestic social norms) influences its identity and interests, 
consequently on national security of the state. “Unit-level” constructivism 
explains that society is social cognitive structure with many discursive formations 
operating within this structure. In turn, discursive formations are constituted of 
identities. The main argument is that states generate their identities and social 
cognitive structures domestically regardless external interconnection with Other 
(Hopf, 2002). According to this approach, states have two most common interests 
– strategic and economic; states define their interests through their domestic 
identities (Hopf, 2002). Therefore, state’s domestically constituted identity is 
important in shaping the perception whether other actors are enemies or allies and 
consequently has crucial impact on states’ foreign policy (Hopf, 2002). 
Third stream within constructivism is “holistic approach”. This perspective 
combines “systemic” and “unit-level” approaches, and argues that identity is 
product of competing views that are influenced from both domestic and 
international level. External interaction with the Other influences on Self’s 
domestic political processes, of which some political groups with their own views 
on national identity are members (Tsygankov, 2013). Such groups hold their 
views about world politics, state’s national identity and its foreign policy. As the 
result domestic and international influences, Self’s domestic politics will be 
shaped by those views, which represent the best strategy to advance Self’s 
national interests given the nature of relations with Other (Tsygankov, 2013). 
Western community has played the critical role of Other in developing and 
constituting Russia’s Self and therefore Russia’s foreign policy and national 
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interest are best understood within the context of Russia’s relations with Western 
countries (Tsygankov, 2013). Rather than arguing that national interest is about 
power and modernization, Tsygankov assumes that Russian behavior in world 
politics is foremost driven by the perceptions whether the West accepts Russian 
“great powerness” or not. When Russia feels that West accepts Russian Self, 
Moscow’s foreign policy takes cooperative stance to the Western countries. In 
contrast, Russia seems to take an aggressive foreign policy line when Russia’s 
efforts to integrate into Western civilization meet rejection from the West. 
Russian foreign policy course also depends on the process whether Western 
reaction reinforces or undermines Russia’s domestic political forces (Westernist, 
Statist, Civilizationist), which perceive Russia’s national identity in different ways 
(Tsygankov 2013, p.15). 
Bobo Lo (2002) provides an explanation to the complex patterns of Russian 
foreign policy in the post-Soviet period from the collapse of the Soviet State to 
Putin’s early presidency. The author argues that after the collapse of Soviet Union 
Yeltsin administration built its policy on illusions and mythmaking and calls it as 
“potemkinization” which meant to establish an alternative reality being far from 
true state of affairs. Lo argues that foreign policy under Yeltsin had some 
irrational patterns that lead to a decline of Russian foreign policy stance 
worldwide. First, Yetsin’s Russia was excessively Westerncentric, but not pro-
Western, meaning that while Russia was under illusions of post-Soviet 
integration, the West maintained its dominant position in the eyes of Moscow. 
Second, major policy statements were hardly a coherent guide to policy 
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realization, rather they were important “as an indicator of political fashion” and 
instruments to conform contradictions within elite and imitation for real policy 
action. Likewise Tsygankov, Lo also agrees that national identity is most critical 
determinant of Russian foreign policy. Two important findings are produced from 
this book. One is “the question of Russia’s global outlook is intimately connected 
with the issue of its imperial identity - not so much Moscow’s imperial ambitions, 
but the extent to which the country’s imperial past has molded conceptions of 
nationhood” (2002, p.21). Another important finding is that “The linkage between 
the policy of diversification [Primakovian “balance of power” vision] and 
unfriendly Western behavior became tighter in reaction to perceived Western 
attempts to establish a unipolar world in which Russia would be relegated to the 
margins” (2002, p.59). 
Lo (2003) also debates the formation of Russian foreign policy starting from 
Putin’s presidency and argues that Putin’s foremost foreign policy objective was 
to revive Russian economy and this agenda was main component of relations 
between Moscow and international community. Lo also gives an analysis of 
Putin’s efforts to integrate Russia with West over security issues during post-9/11 
period. Russia’s stance during this period the author describes as “strategic 
opportunism” meaning that it was not Putin’s “strategic choice”, rather the 
situation indicated how Moscow effectively used “an extraordinary set of 
circumstances” to achieve some objectives that were difficult to fulfill (Lo 2003, 
p.129). According to Lo’s assessment, the actual shifts were in Western reactions 
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after 9/11 events and the outcome significantly enhanced role for Russia that 
could merely be achieved by Russian own efforts. 
While above-mentioned authors analyze Russian foreign policy in broader 
context, Dmitri Trenin (2007) provides detailed historical background of Russo-
CA relations and Russian interests in this region since Russian Tsarist Empire. 
The author demonstrates that Russian Empire’s interest in CA (then Turkestan) 
was inconstant until nineteenth century. The factor that made Russia to shift its 
interest to this space was its defeat in the Crimean War. This war restrained 
Russia in the Black Sea and the Balkans, damaged its prestige in Europe. Trenin 
argues that Russia turned its interest to CA to compensate injuries from the 
Crimean war and to manifest the capability to pose serious challenges to British 
Empire’s growing hegemony (Trenin 2007, pp.77-78). One can draw parallels 
between that period and the early 2000s. This is an important finding, which 
provides idea that Russia’s national identity has been driving force of its foreign 
policy since Russia’s initial engagement in the region. Stressing Moscow’s 
current policy in CA, the author argues that Russia has neither objective nor 
capability to restore “Eurasian super-state”, as it is realistic enough to realize 
region’s many links with outside world. To some extent, it is due to rising 
influence of other powers in CA and Moscow’s limited military capabilities to 
dominate region’s security environment (Trenin 2007, p.104). What Moscow 
seeks in the region is “favorable conditions for economic expansion and political 
influence which guarantees loyalty” (Trenin 2007, p.81). Moreover Trenin offers 
detailed discussion about Russia’s stance after 9/11, in particular Moscow’s 
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efforts to cooperate with Washington in CA. Soon after, when Russia did not 
receive expected Western recognition for its cooperation, Moscow took more 
aggressive stance to withstand Washington’s hegemony in CA. 
Joseph Ferguson (2006) provides analysis of Russian thinking toward CA 
during Yeltsin’s presidency. In his discussion, the author states that although 
Kremlin tried to abandon from the region and focus on Russia’s relations with 
Euro-Atlantic community, CA played (and will always play) big role in Russian 
strategy and geopolitical calculations. Along with security interests, Moscow 
could not abandon the region due to the deep cultural affinities and large Russian 
population of CA. Moreover, Moscow’s fear to be marginalized from CA reached 
its highest point in 1997 as Washington established CENTRASBAT (Central 
Asian Battalion) – a joint battalion with Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek military 
forces. An important finding that was obtained from this text is the link between 
the resurgence of Russian Statist thinking and its foreign policy in the context of 
growing Western assertiveness in CA. 
The next section of the literature review turns to the discussion of grand 
strategy and Chinese foreign policy in Central Asia. 
2.2. Grand Strategy: China and its foreign policy in Central Asia 
The term “grand strategy” traditionally emphasized a set of military plans 
that states designed to win battles. As a modern notion “grand strategy” has 
broadened its meaning and now refers to the employment not only military means, 
but also political, economic and diplomatic capabilities together to maintain 
state’s security and advance its national interests (Feaver, 2009). While 
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traditionally grand strategy was designed to win wars, now it is concerned with 
achieving peace in long term (Martel, 2015). 
The most important point of grand strategy is in policy to bring all military 
and nonmilitary elements together to preserve and enhance nation’s best interests 
during the periods of war and peace (Kennedy 1991, p.4). Kennedy highlights 
three main factors that are usually omitted from traditional analysis of grand 
strategies. First, managing state’s natural resources is important to balance 
between ends and means of grand strategy. It is crucial to maintain country’s 
defense capabilities, however states must achieve this aim in balance with their 
economic capacity. Economic component of grand strategy has no less priority to 
maintain country’s security (Kennedy 1991, p.4). Second is the importance of 
diplomacy to enhance nation’s stance both in periods of war and peace. 
Diplomacy enables state to gain allies, ensure the support of neutral parties and 
reduce the number of potential enemies (Kennedy 1991, p.5). Finally, national 
morale and political culture are critical issues in receiving population’s support to 
share burdens of wartime and cost of maintaining defense forces in peacetime 
(Kennedy 1991, p.5). 
William Martel (2015) maintains that grand strategy “is a coherent 
statement of the state’s highest political ends to be pursued globally in the long 
term”. The author states that grand strategy rests on three instruments of power: 
(a) diplomatic (political) power or how states employ their political and economic 
influence to advance national interests; (b) country’s economic and technologic 
power or nation’ resources that state employs to realize its policies; (c) military 
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capabilities that can be used to achieve nation’s interests (Martel, 2015). The 
argument goes that function of grand strategies is to prioritize between various 
domestic and foreign policy choices and integrate all military and nonmilitary 
means to achieve those highest ends. In fact, grand strategy sets a framework, 
which facilitates statesmen to make coherent decisions about foreign policy 
conduct. In this sense, Martel emphasizes several elements that provide links 
between grand strategy and foreign policy. Foremost element of grand strategy is 
that it “must provide a coherent statement of what state seeks to achieve in foreign 
policy”. Second, grand strategy comprises nation’s highest political ends so that 
decision makers consider what they seek in foreign policy and what steps they 
take to conduct nation’s foreign policy (Martel 2015, p.33-34). 
In presenting his arguments, Avery Goldstein refers to the notion of “grand-
strategy” as “combination of military, political and economic means a state 
employs to pursue its goals within the constraints posed by the international 
environment” (Goldstein 2003, p.87). The author states that China’s grand 
strategy is a product of country’s efforts to deal with the challenges of unipolar 
system, as well as Chinese way to promote multipolar regime in international 
relations and exploit opportunities of transition from unipolar system to that of 
multipolar. Goldstein argues that grand strategy is crucial particularly in case of 
China – not dominant yet but seeking to be so, who needs to minimize the risks of 
likely opposition of other states to its rise. According to the theory of realism, the 
power in systemic anarchy is distributed unevenly and the system punishes those 
states that possess the capability to become a great power but fail to do so (Waltz, 
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1979). At the same time, potential powers face systemic constraints from other 
actors, who see the rise of great powers as threats to their very existence in the 
anarchy. Given such circumstances and China’s potential of major power, it is 
likely that China faces oppositions from other actors. Therefore, China needs 
well-established strategy, which would alleviate these perceptions and ensure 
China’s secure rise. Looking at China’s strategy during the late 1990s, Goldstein 
points that various theoretical perspectives forecast China’s rise would be 
disruptive in challenging Western dominance. These perspectives could merely 
identify shifts in China’s strategy at that period. According to Goldstein’s 
assessment by mid-1990s, China realized expenses and risks of “challenger’s 
role” and therefore Beijing changed its approach for “subtle, though no less self-
interested” one. 
In another account Goldstein (2005) defines the “grand strategy” more 
precisely, pointing that states do not simply develop plans to realize their goals. 
States build their plans in such circumstances where they must foresee whether 
other actors would oppose or facilitate their efforts (Goldstein, 2005). Moreover, 
the text explains why China did not follow other available options such as 
hegemony, balancing, bandwagoning or isolationist strategies, as major IR 
theories predict. Rather, the argument goes that China has designed a distinct 
strategy that rests on two main components. The one is diplomacy that aims to 
establish various partnerships with major powers and make China essential and 
necessary actor with its own interests that should not be violated by other states. 
The other is creating an “activist agenda”, which gives Beijing the reputation of 
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responsible partner and mitigates others’ worries about China’s rise (Goldstein 
2005, pp.29-30). China’s current stance in CA manifests both components. On the 
one hand, China is advancing its policy in CA through partnership with Russia, 
without altering latter’s role. On the other hand, China now is provider of “public 
goods” (investment, financial aid) for CA. This role makes China more attractive 
in the eyes of local states. In the mid 1990s due to the growing concerns about 
China’s rise, Beijing decided to change its traditional bilateral approach to that of 
multilateral. In this sense, the role of “Shanghai Five” group and later Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) enable China to demonstrate itself as a 
responsible regional partner. 
Evan Medeiros (2009) maintains that China has developed foreign policy 
strategy, which seeks to realize several distinct objectives. The first objective is to 
maintain secure international environment that fosters domestic reforms and 
development. In this sense, China’s foreign policy seeks to maintain stability in 
peripheral territories so that its leadership would focuses more on domestic 
economic development (p.51). The second is that Beijing is trying to reassure its 
neighbors (particularly in Asia) and other states that China’s rising capabilities 
will not disrupt their security and economic stability. In doing so Beijing tries to 
convince neighbors that China’s rise is opportunity, not threat (p.52). Third 
objective is to reduce the willingness of China’s Asian neighbors, unilaterally or 
collectively, contain its rise. China seeks to build multilateral cooperation that has 
limited US presence and China does so by avoiding direct confrontation with the 
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US (p.56). Finally, China’s diplomacy seeks political relationships with oil-rich 
regions in order to diversify and maintain stable energy supplies (p.60).  
Compared to above described authors, Fravel (2008) offers distinct account 
on China’s behavior over border and territorial disputes with its neighbors. The 
scholar explains why China took cooperative and conciliatory stance in some 
disputes despite predictions of major IR theories and scholars that China would 
become “prone to muscle-flexing” in its foreign policy. Fravel’s framework 
explains why and how states compromise in territorial disputes and outlines three 
basic strategies available for states. In particular, states can (a) do nothing and 
postpone settlement, (b) propose concessions and compromise, (c) threaten or use 
force (Fravel 2008, p.5). The author argues that states compromise when they face 
domestic or external threats to their security and when the cost of pressure for 
claimed land outweighs the cost of land itself. The likelihood of establishing 
alliance against the claimant state by its adversaries or armed rebellion makes 
state to change its aggressive stance and offer possible concessions. In this sense, 
this framework offers an important finding to assess China’s behavior in border 
and territorial disputes with its neighbors in CA when China was facing domestic 
threats to its security. Another point that follows from this framework is the 
parallel between China’s compliant behavior over territorial claims and the 
second component of its grand strategy that indicates Beijing’s efforts to create an 
image of amicable partner. This point also proves the hypothesis that CA is 
important for the realization of China’s grand strategy. 
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While above-mentioned authors provide views on China’s overall strategy, 
Zhao (2007) offers detailed study about China’s regional policy in CA. According 
to Zhao China divides its relations with outside world into three main ranks: great 
powers, neighboring countries and developing states. The main argument goes 
that CA is corresponded to China’s “peripheral strategy”, which aims to maintain 
security environment, improve China’s strategic position and enlarge its 
international influence. China’s foremost objective is to eliminate the concerns 
about “China threat” and to make its neighbors feel more secure by offering more 
aid and enable them to take advantage from its growth (Zhao 2007, p.153). Unlike 
traditional views, the argument goes that Beijing’s foreign policy in CA is driven 
to satisfy China’s domestic demands and not to establish exclusive sphere for 
influence. For this reason Beijing’s approach is introverted, rather than 
expansionist (Zhao 2007, p.157). Zhao also states that China should avoid the 
stance that would challenge any external power in the region. If China is 
successful to develop long-term relations with CA, the region will become 
foothold in China’s rise to global power. If China fails to do so, it may damage its 
peripheral policies (Zhao 2007, pp.153-156). In terms of Sino-Russian relations in 
CA, the author stresses how China pursues its interests in CA without altering 
those of Russia. Although China recognizes Russia’s exclusive interests in the 
region, common objective for the two is to prevent unnecessary competition and 
conflict. Hence, this finding is another evidence that supports the argument about 
importance of CA for China’s grand strategy. The next section of this chapter 
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provides a review of literatures, which offer “systemic-level” analysis of current 
relation in Central Asia. 
2.3. “Systemic-level” approaches 
Rein Müllerson (2013) offers a comparative analysis of international 
relations in Central Asia by dividing them into two periods. The first period 
examines “Great Game I” that occurred in the 19th century. The second period 
explains “Great Game II”, which involves current relations in the region. 
According to the author, today Central Asia is an area where China and Russia – 
significant players and potential competitors for dominance in world affairs – 
have their interests as well as vulnerabilities, and where the US has its strategic 
interests, too. The author argues that current relations in CA have signs of rivalry 
among external powers and labels such rivalry as “effectively containing a rising 
China” and “minimizing Russia’s strategic space”. Müllerson also points out 
opportunities for cooperation between powers, particularly in combating against 
global issues such as terrorism and drug trafficking. In general, whether rivalry or 
cooperation among China, Russia and United States prevails in Central Asia will 
depend largely on what kind of international order will eventually emerge from 
current world disorder. 
Stephen Blank (2010) points out that geopolitical importance of Central 
Asia derives from its proximity to major world powers, the international threat of 
Islamic terrorism arising from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and its abundance in 
significant energy deposits. Another factor in Central Asia’s geopolitical 
importance is the increasing rivalry including not only the great powers such as 
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Russia, China and America, but also India, Turkey, East Asian states as well 
(Blank 2010, p.281). Weak regional cooperation also exacerbated this external 
involvement in the region. These problematic interventions, according to the 
author, should focus on searching stability and security in the region, rather than 
on competition and rivalry between outside powers. Along with geopolitical 
calculations, the engagement of other powers (Russia, China, India, Pakistan) is 
based on their domestic security demands, which are closely linked to CA (Blank 
2010, p.287). For instance, only politically stable and economically prosperous 
Central Asia can ensure whether China is successful in its efforts to develop its 
Western provinces. China’s current contributions in terms of cheap loans and 
huge investment ensures not only stable energy resources from CA, but also gives 
China advantages to demand from local states more active efforts to eliminate 
support to religious movements in Xinjiang (Blank 2010, p.291-292). 
In another monograph, Stephen Blank  (2014) develops analysis on Russia’s 
latest initiatives in Central Asia. The establishment of regional bloc in Central 
Asia, such as Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is crucial to the survival and 
durability of Putin’s system and has roots in Russian feeling of “great powerness”. 
As the author notes, the EEU gives Moscow an opportunity to present itself as a 
Eurasian major power that improves its self-esteem feeling and its stance in the 
eyes of international community (Blank 2014, p.21). The author also states that 
Russia’s relations with Central Asia through regional project have two basic 
dimensions: first, the efforts to limit or thwart China’s economic expansion in 
Central Asia; second, Moscow believes that “commanding” with such bloc gives 
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impression that Russia is Eurasian great power and ensures Russian voice in 
Central Asia. Therefore, Moscow’s aim is to maintain its influence in CA thereby 
by limiting opportunities for other powers, in particular for China, who already 
has displaced Russia in terms of trade and investment (Blank 2014, p.22). 
Alexander Cooley (2012) focuses on American, Russian and Chinese 
politics in Central Asia during 2001-2011. The central analysis of the piece covers 
dynamics of the interaction between the United States, Russia and China and their 
different strategic interests. It also identifies influence tools of the external 
powers, and provides assessment of their impact on Central Asia’s political 
institutions and practices. In providing analysis, the author advances three main 
arguments. First, security goals and strategic goals of external powers in Central 
Asia are mostly different, which allows them to simultaneously pursue their 
interests in the region. At the same time they were able to so without major 
confrontation. Cooley points that although Moscow longer enjoys regional 
primacy as it did centuries ago, compared to other powers Russia still has upper 
hand in influencing regional relations (Cooley 2012, p.51). Second argument is 
that interaction between Washington, Moscow and Beijing in Central Asia has 
intensified, but this “zero-sum” game and competition for relative gains during 
2001-2011 were neither exclusive nor dominant form of power relations. Cooley 
points that efforts to export democracy into CA is the main reason for 
Washington’s diminishing role in this region (Cooley 2012, p.164). Colley finds 
China as the most benefited state among other powers and argues that Beijing’s 
motivations in CA are twofold. One is to loosen Uighur separatism; another is to 
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extract energy resources (Cooley 2012, p.166). Third argument is that local states 
now have their own voices in great powers’ interaction and their role should not 
be ignored. For instance, local governments have been successfully employing 
China’s growing economic influence to break Russian monopoly on exporting 
energy resources to China. 
Remainder of this research comprises findings and discussion. Chapter 2 





CHAPTER THREE: NATIONAL IDENTITY OF RUSSIA AND ITS 
FOREIGN POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA 
For more than one century, Central Asia (CA) has been under the control of 
Russian Empire and later Soviet Union. The end of Cold War and dissolution of 
Soviet Union changed political order in CA and provided independence to five 
republics in the region. The collapse of Soviet state opened CA to the rest of 
world and the region has become geopolitically important for external powers. 
New reality in the region demanded Russia to pursue a foreign policy, which has 
been distinct from Soviet traditional approach. The history of Russia-CA relations 
during last two decades shows that Moscow’s policy towards region was not free 
from fluctuations. At times, under the aim to integrate itself with Western world, 
Russia shunned CA and lost its influence there. Yet, it became apparent that 
Westernization policy had damaged Russian “great power” identity and 
diminished its influence in international affairs. Once Moscow realized those 
failures, it sought to restore Russia’s “great power” status in world politics and 
therefore Moscow changed its hitherto policy over post-Soviet space, including 
CA. This chapter explains how Russian national identity influenced Moscow’s 
decision to regain its stance in CA that had been lost during early post-Soviet 
years and argues that national identity still plays primary role in the formation of 
Russia’s foreign policy towards CA. The first section briefly outlines the idea of 
national identity, Russian foreign policy traditions and each tradition’s views on 
Russian national identity. Subsequent sections discuss three periods of Russian 
foreign policy towards CA; each period examines security, economic and 
	 32 
institutional cooperation. Through such periodization, chapter provides evidences 
of Russian foreign policy in CA in accordance with the change in Russian 
national identity and its foreign policy traditions. 
3.1. National identity and foreign policy traditions of Russia 
This section briefly discusses what the “identity” is and how it influences on 
foreign policy of states. Then the section outlines foreign policy thinking of 
Russia under Russian national identity and its foreign policy traditions.  
3.1.1. Identity and constructivist perspective. 
The notion of identity is central category of the constructivist perspective of 
international relations (IR). For social constructivists two main fundamentals 
govern social relationships. The first factor is that structures, which involve 
human association, are established by shared views rather than material forces. 
Second, interests and identities of actors are not given by nature; instead, they are 
based on the shared ideas of social agents (Wendt, 1999). In this sense 
international system is not the space where military, economic and diplomatic 
capabilities compete, rather this system is shaped by the interaction of different 
structures of identities, which are core elements of state’s behavior under this 
system. Although constructivists agree that international system is anarchic, they 
claim that the way in which anarchy constraints states depends on how states 
conceive the anarchy and understand their own identity and interests (Wendt, 
1992). Accordingly, constructivism maintains that states’ goals, such as security 
and material development or international recognition are formed by their social 
identities or how they view themselves in relation to other players in the world 
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community. Anarchy is composed of various social structures and arrangements 
and these structures are organized and determined accordingly with states’ social 
identities (Griffiths & O’Callaghan, 2002). The ways that states frame their 
national interests and develop appropriate means to secure these interests are 
generated by their identities (Griffiths & O’Callaghan, 2002). 
If realism maintains that anarchy is naturally conflictual and therefore forces 
states to compete for relative gains, for constructivists the anarchy cannot impose 
predetermined nature of affairs between states. Rather the system changes its 
“nature” accordingly to the interaction among various identities or as Wendt states 
“anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt 1992, p.132). The nature of anarchy 
may be conflictual if players behave in antagonistic way towards other states 
(Weber, 2010). The system may also have cooperative nature when states act 
cooperatively towards each other (Weber, 2010). Therefore, the anarchy has no 
predefined nature; its nature is defined by states themselves. To realize whether 
the nature of world politics is conflictual or cooperative, one should focus on 
states’ behavior, which is driven by their identities and interests, rather than 
competitive nature of international anarchy. The most important thing is that what 
states do depends upon what states’ identities and interest are, and identities and 
interests change (emphasis in original, Weber 2010, p.62). For constructivists the 
most important thing is to understand how identities and interests of states are 
constructed – how they are made or produced in and through specific international 
interactions (Weber 2010, p.62). Preservation or security of the self is main 
concern in the process of identity-formation under anarchy. The concept of 
	 34 
security varies depending on how the “self” is identified cognitively by the 
“other”; therefore, the distribution of power in the system depends on such 
cognitive variations (Wendt 1992, pp.399-400). 
Constructivists insist that state interaction is not among fixed national 
interests, rather the process must be understood as an action that shapes and is 
shaped by different identities over time (Griffiths & O’Callaghan, 2002). 
Identities are not pre-determined either, but they are generated through 
interactions with other actors (Weber, 2010). Similarly, nation’s identity and 
interests are developed within the interactions between “Self” and “Other”. The 
interaction with the Other establishes significant context for Self’s existence. The 
Other’s actions towards Self may have decisive or destructive impact on the 
national identity of Self (Tsygankov, 2013). In turn, Self’s future actions 
(cooperative or antagonistic) depend on whether Self assigns these impacts as 
either approving or denying its recognition by the Other. Thus, national identity is 
the system of values that illustrates Self’s emotional, cognitive and evaluative 
position towards Other (Tsygankov 2013, p.15). Next section explains what 
Russian national identity is and how it influences on foreign policy of the country. 
3.1.2. Russian national identity and its foreign policy traditions. 
It is hard to explain changes in Russian foreign policy only by assuming that 
national interest are about power or modernization. Russian national interest and 
foreign policy choices are best explained in the scope of Russia’s national identity 
and its relationships with the West (Tsygankov, 2013). It would be misleading if 
one understands Russian “Self” and its foreign policy as a new state that became 
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independent from Soviet Union in 1991. Rather, modern Russia’s national 
identity and its foreign policy choices have close links with “Soviet”, “Imperial” 
and “Tsarist” epochs within its history (Trenin, 2009). The patterns of relations 
between Russia’s Self and the West (i.e. the significant Other) have been affecting 
Russian identity and its foreign policy traditions throughout Russia’s history 
(Tsygankov, 2013). As it was mentioned above, Self may take either aggressive or 
amicable stance depending on the recognition of Self by the Other. Thus, at times 
when Russia wanted to integrate into Western system of values but the West left 
such actions unrecognized or opposed them, Russia followed hostile stance 
towards the Other. In other words, Western recognition encourages Russian 
liberals to maintain that Russia belongs to European community, while restraining 
such recognition enforces conservative identity, which insists on Russian great 
powerness and independence from the West (Tsygankov, 2012). At the same 
time, such decisions have domestic concerns. If Russia thinks that it is internally 
weak, then Moscow typically focuses on protecting its image of great power 
unless it reaches the degree of confidence (Tsygankov, 2012).  
Understanding Russia as newly established post-Soviet state with newly 
formed foreign policy traditions is inaccurate. For understanding the formation of 
overall Russian foreign policy and its evolution, one should consider three 
traditions of Russian foreign policy and how they define Russia’s national 
identity. Throughout its history, Russia has developed three distinct traditions in 
foreign policy thinking - Westernist, Statist and Civilizationist. All these 
traditions have presented Russia’s national identity based on their historically 
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established visions of the country and reactions from outside world (Tsygankov, 
2013). Historically, foreign policy choices of each group have been formed as a 
response to Western reactions, which derived from those decisions, and these 
interactions influenced Russia’s diplomacy in CA. The history of Russia shows 
that it defines European values as the orientation for Russian identity and it has 
been core objective for foreign policy (Tsygankov, 2013). At times when Russia 
feels unappreciated, it takes an aggressive stance and wants to show how great it 
is. To regain these losses in its foreign policy Russia seeks to enhance its identity 
of “great powerness” by improving its relations with Asian and post-Soviet 
countries. In this sense, CA – the region where Russia enjoys capability of power 
projection, appears to be a critical component in the formation of Russian foreign 
policy. 
Since Peter the Great’s period Russian leadership has been facing dilemma 
how to fit Russia into Western system of values. Some of Russian leaders 
preferred close relationships with West; others wanted Russia to have limited 
Western engagement. Yet, there were some who led Russia through neither 
integration nor limited engagement with Western world, rather they preferred 
Russia to create its own system of values based on Slavic identity.  
The identity of Russian Europeanness is core component for Westernist 
foreign policy school, which maintains the similarity between Western and 
Russian identities. For Westernizers the West is the most viable and progressive 
world civilizations, thus Russia’s Self has been striving to be recognized by the 
West as the part of European community. Under the identity of Europeanness 
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Russian leaders have highlighted the importance of integration into Europe for 
political, strategic and economic reasons (Lo, 2002). For instance, for Gorbachev 
the idea of mutual security with the West became essential. He maintained 
revolutionary agreements on arms-control with the US and supported Soviet 
troops’ withdrawal from European continent (Tsygankov, 2013). Gorbachev also 
highlighted the similarity of Russian and Western identities. During his speech in 
1984 Gorbachev stated that Russians were Europeans foremost and argued that 
Soviet Union had to adopt idea of “common European home” and promoted the 
integration between Russia and Europe, which would rest on the principles of 
European social democracy (Lo 2002, p.15-16). In early post-Soviet period, 
Russia embraced the idea of the integration with Europe even closer. Liberal 
Westernizers under Yeltsin were cautious about relations with Soviet era allies 
and they assumed that Russia could overcome its economic and political 
backwardness only by establishing Western liberal institutions based on values of 
democracy and market economy (Tsygankov, 2013). Later these perceptions of 
close economic and political relations with the European countries transcended to 
the understanding that Russia’s involvement in Europe is “critical to its sense of 
self-worth”. Yeltsin administration expected that Western assistance in rebuilding 
post-Soviet Russia and its recognition of Russia as global power would have 
legitimizing effect on both domestic and foreign policies (Lo 2002, pp. 15, 44-
45). 
Another foreign policy school is Statist tradition and it is likely the most 
influential thinking line in Russian foreign policy. Statists maintain that Russia 
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has Eurasian identity and it is foremost great Eurasian power (Lo, 2002). In 
contrast to liberal Westernizers, Statists appreciate the ideas of power, stability 
and sovereignty more than the values of freedom and democracy, and the most 
critical is concept of external threat to Russian security. As Hopf (2002) has found 
this type of Russian identity has been produced through the interaction with Other 
states, rather than being formed through domestic identity. Eurasian identity is not 
strictly anti-Western, however it strives for the Western recognition by enhancing 
economic and military capabilities (Tsygankov 2013, p.5-7). Such unique identity 
assigns Russia the ability to accomplish the things that is not achievable for other 
countries, or even the group of countries (Lo, 2002). Main among these is that 
Russia is the guarantor of stability on Eurasian landmass. At the same time, 
Eurasian identity is not limited to regional affairs. The “great powerness” 
certainly implies that Russian foreign policy has global perspective on world 
politics and necessitates Russia to deal simultaneously with the main international 
powers. Finally, Eurasianism has produced the belief that Russia is the bridge 
between East and West - the idea through which Russia sought to increase its 
international prestige in managing various issues, such Middle East peace talks or 
Korean nuclear problem (Lo, 2002). 
In post-Soviet era, there appeared the so-called liberal statists, who avoided 
a single-party state and started to apply market economy and political democracy. 
They believed that Russia was still subject to external threats and thereby it 
should maintain great power status with the “right of involvement” in any case 
that it deemed vital to Russian interests (Lo, 2002). The main argument of Statists 
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is that Russia should be treated as a power, without which world affairs cannot be 
managed (Lo, 2002). Primakov and Putin are the proponents of this tradition, yet 
they followed distinct policies to obtain great power status. There is a significant 
difference between foreign policy of Primakov and Putin. The former advocated 
to contain the US via strategic alliances and tried to restore Moscow’s influence in 
ex-Soviet space, whereas the latter supported Russia’s relationships in its 
periphery and acknowledged the partnership with Western countries and wanted 
to achieve their recognition through the cooperation in fighting against 
international terrorism (Tsygankov 2013, p.8). 
Finally, Civilizationist tradition, which refers to Russia’s Slavic identity, 
claims that Russian values are different from those of Western. Civilizationists 
viewed the West hostile to Russian national interests and opposed efforts of 
integration with Western world (Lo, 2002). In order to withstand Western 
expansion, Civilizationsists wanted Russia to create its own empire of cultural 
unity beyond its southern and eastern borders (Tsygankov, 2013). Although thaw 
in relations and alliance between Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1955 had 
geopolitical calculations, the two countries achieved alliance thanks to the fact 
that “a common Slavic identity made the two countries more similar (Hopf 2002, 
p.113). Later, during late and early post-Soviet periods in Russian Duma some 
proponents of this identity organized groups against those of liberals. They 
criticized liberal policy for its overly close relations with the West, which 
undermined Russia’s national interests and its Slavic identity. During 1994-95 
Nationalists claimed that Russia was becoming excessively dependent on Western 
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loans and blamed Kremlin was losing control over Russian national economy for 
its inconsistent foreign policy (Tsygankov, 2013). Rather they called Russia to 
establish the union with Belarus and Ukraine under Slavic identity. The central 
idea for Civilizationists is that Russia cannot be judged through the norms 
accepted elsewhere in civilized world and therefore it must pursue its own way of 
political and economic development (Lo, 2002). 
In sum, Westernist, Statist and Civilizationist traditions have different 
perceptions on Russia’s national identity. Each group’s views on Russian identity 
have influenced its foreign policy choices in building relationships both with 
Western and post-Soviet countries.  
Remainder of this chapter explains of Russian foreign policy in Central Asia 
through three phases. The first includes early post-Soviet period from 1991 to 
1995, the second phase covers the period from mid 1990s to 2000, and the third 
one discusses the period of 2000s. Each of the following sections explains in 
detail how aforementioned Russian foreign policy traditions and their views on its 
national identity influenced Russia’s foreign policy in Central Asia. 
3.2. First period (1991-1995) 
This section’s main argument is that Russia’s foreign policy in post-Soviet 
space during the early years after the dissolution of Soviet Union was inconsistent 
and paradoxical. The discussion of this stage maintains that overall Russian 
foreign policy was characterized by traditions of Westernism and therefore under 
such identity Russian diplomacy could not develop clear views toward ex-Soviet 
states. 
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To ensure Russia’s transition into Western values, Kremlin sought to relieve 
Russia from post-Soviet legacy. This idea became popular in late Gorbachevian 
era, when Yeltsin used this idea as an argument in his campaign against 
Gorbachev. Supporters of Westernist vision (then-head of Cabinet Gaidar, and 
then-foreign minister Kozyrev) considered CA as ‘appendix’, which would create 
obstacles for aspiration of economic reforms and inclusion of Russia into Western 
economic and political system (Ferguson 2006, p.207). There was a conviction 
that Russia was suffering from being “internal colony” of Soviet Union, as it had 
to carry burden of other members. Yeltsin himself criticized the burden of 
southern republics, viewed them economically “backward” and politically 
conservative for having halted Russia’s modernization and therefore prompted 
them to grasp “maximum sovereignty” (Laruelle, 2010). Moreover, among 
Russians there were feelings of nationalism and “islamophobia”, which regarded 
Central Asia as a dangerous zone of cultural threats to survival of Russians 
(Laruelle 2008, p.45). The views mentioned above prompted Moscow’s policy of 
abandoning from the political responsibility in relation to CA republics. 
3.2.1. Institution building. 
During early post-Soviet time what linked Russia and Central Asia was the 
framework of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The CIS itself, which 
initially included only Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, never expected to be an 
organization that would facilitate cooperation. Rather, it was projected by Yeltsin 
to defeat Gorbachev and finalize the separation of all ex-Soviet members 
(Tsygankov, 2013). During early 1990s after Gorbachev’s resign, Yeltsin and new 
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Russian liberals sought for “little Russia” which let borderlands go for 
independence without any strings with Russia. Therefore, the administration 
under Yeltsin started to eliminate the fundamentals of soviet state legacy that 
linked Russia with post-Soviet countries. 
Under the view of Westernism Russia could not formulate a clear policy 
towards former Soviet states, in particular concerning CA. Although Moscow 
claimed everywhere that relations with former Soviet states were vital, the 
administration was unable to set well-coordinated agenda related to CIS (Lo, 
2002). 
The first issue was to define whether CIS should be a “space” for 
disintegration of former Soviet Union states or should it be a ground for those 
states’ political and economic integration with new framework. Some supported 
the idea that CIS integration had to be primary objective for Russian diplomacy 
due to long-term political, economic and cultural association that existed between 
Russia and other former soviet states within Russian empire and later Soviet 
Union. At the same time, among Russian decision-makers there was no accord on 
how much Kremlin should spend on reviving CIS. As Yeltsin then put it, “the 
integration of Commonwealth must not be detrimental to Russia itself or involve 
the overstraining of our forces and resources, both material and financial (as cited 
in Lo 2002, p.74). Some of Yeltsin’s advisers believed that reintegration would 
cost Russia vital resources that otherwise could be used for its own domestic 
needs. Meanwhile, for others CIS was priority for Russia to serve its long-term 
interests (Lo, 2002). 
	 43 
Another issue was over the nature and identity of CIS as an institution. 
There was no precise vision whether CIS should be a commonwealth of equal 
states or an institution through which Moscow could reassure its influence over 
post-Soviet space. In reality, however, CIS became a mechanism for peaceful 
disintegration of new states, which effectively prevented the conflicts over the 
distribution of Soviet Union’s assets (Lo 2002, p.72-73). 
There was another difficulty in forming coherent policy towards CIS. It 
related to the question of policy implementation mechanisms whether Moscow 
should realize its policy on case-by-case or region-by-region approach. Here too 
Moscow lacked well-coordinated policy. While Kremlin prioritized relations with 
Trans-Caucasus, given its proximity with Russia’s Muslim-populated regions, 
Moscow’s approach to Muslim-populated CA was less obvious (Lo, 2002). Some 
were advocating the repatriation of Russian population from CA, while others 
warned that Russia could meddle into conflicts in CA against its own interests 
(Lo, 2002). The proponents of limited relations with CA believed that Islamic 
threat emanating from the region was overly exaggerated and there would be no 
serious threats for Russian security in long-term. In other words, the outcome of 
conflict between imperial identity and liberal foreign policy thinking of Russian 
elite was “hegemony on the cheap” (Lo 2002, p.77). 
3.2.2. Security and military policy. 
In 1992 Russia announced itself as a successor of Soviet Union, thus it had 
to follow the obligations of agreements, particularly those signed between Soviet 
Union and Afghanistan in 1978 and Collective Security Treaty (CST) signed 
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between Russia and CA states in 1992. However, Yeltsin’s Russia stopped 
assisting to Kabul and left Afghanistan alone with civil war (Paramonov et.al, 
2008). Once being without support, government of Afghanistan under Najibullah 
lost the control over country and collapsed in 1992. Further escalation of conflict 
turned Afghanistan to home for extremist groupings (Paramonov, et.al, 2008). In 
the sphere of security, Kremlin planned gradually to withdraw Russian troops 
from the region. In solving security issues and conflicts, Moscow sought to rely 
on international organizations. For instance, Yeltsin ordered to recall CIS troops 
from Nagorno-Karabakh, at the same time, for peacekeeping objectives in the 
region, Kremlin sought to deploy UN or NATO troops (Tsygankov, 2013). 
Although there were only small number of Russian troops in Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan along with international borders with China, 
Afghanistan and Iran, Moscow reduced military cooperation with CA, which left 
intentions of creating collective security system unrealized (Paramonov, et.al, 
2008).  
In general, then-Kremlin administration tried to distance Russia from 
Central Asian events. Moscow’s presence in CA became only formal, and thus 
Moscow was unable to take serious actions in stabilizing civil wars in 
Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Additionally, Russia did not take any attempts to 
form a unified approach when NATO launched its “Partnership for Peace” 
program in Central Asian region and obtained an observer status in Central Asian 
Union (Lo, 2002). 
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3.2.3. Economic policy. 
Along with the issues discussed above, Yeltsin administration had no 
coherent plans of economic cooperation between Russia and CA. Kremlin’s 
domestic economic policy was committed to “shock therapy” and rapid transition 
to market economy. Moscow announced the reduction of state subsidies, rapid 
privatization of land and industries and strict monetary policy for peacekeeping 
objectives there. To unify its own currency system, Russia decided to withdraw 
unilaterally from the ruble zone. The common economic space was no longer 
available. The collapse in communication and transport networks led to the 
economic decline. During the first half of 1990s, economies in CA fell to 40-60 
percent of their 1989 level (Dittmer 2007, p.12). Despite Moscow’s earlier 
obligations to consult with former Soviet republics in terms of economic policy 
and claims from CA to preserve common payment system, Moscow ceased 
money supplies to them, which created crisis in CA (Swanström, 2011). Moscow 
also ignored results of March 1990 referendum in CA, where 90 percent of votes 
called to preserve the Soviet Union (Dittmer 2007, p.12). 
The exclusion of Central Asian economies from common trade system 
resulted a sharp decrease in trade relationships with Russia. During 1992-1993, 
Russia-CA trade volume shrunk sharply and accounted $6 billion compared to 
that of $60 billion in 1991 (Laruelle 2010, p.155). 
In the sphere of cultural relations, Kremlin also preferred to isolate Russia 
from relations with CA. Moscow acknowledged no responsibility for ethnic 
Russians outside of Russia. Once then-foreign minister Kozyrev claimed, 
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“Russians outside Russia did not constitute a special problem for the Russian 
government” (Tsygankov 2013, p.83). 
Eventually, Western countries did not appreciate the concessions that Russia 
made for pursuit of Western-style reforms and did not accord the status and role 
that Russia expected (Lo, 2003; Tsygankov, 2012). First, Yeltsin’s Russia could 
not become an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic community and domestic reforms 
were not successful and did not lead to “the Russian economic miracle”. 
Furthermore, Moscow lost the opportunity to have any serious influence on 
policies of Western countries. Second, Kremlin’s chaotic and contradictory 
foreign policy in mid 1990s destined to “lose hold” of Central Asia, not only 
politically, but also in the military and economic spheres (Laruelle 2010, p.156). 
Third, in most Central Asian countries there was a feeling of alienation towards 
Russia and the policy of escaping from “burden” of CA provoked the outbreak of 
anti-Russian sentiment in the region (Syroezhkin, 2002).  
3.2.4. Outcomes. 
No significant effort from West to support Moscow's integration into the 
Euro-Atlantic community increased irritation within analytical and scientific 
circles in Russia (Paramonov, et.al, 2008). Opponents of then administration had 
conviction that Russia’s weakness came to advantage for major Western powers 
and they were no longer considering Russian interests. Subsequently, Western 
countries’ behavior to establish a unipolar world order where Russia would have a 
marginal role became unfriendly for Moscow. Likewise, too close identification 
with Western values became as subordination of national identity and interests 
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(Tsygankov, 2013). In addition, there were views that Russia would never become 
an equal part of the West with latter’s terms, it could only remain as major global 
power as long as it preserved distinct identity (Lo 2002, p.58-59).  
In addition, Yeltsin administration received harsh internal criticism from 
opposition forces that were skeptical about Atlanticism and called for independent 
foreign policy (Bogaturov, 2006). Failures of administration increased resentment 
among public and majority of elites towards Western countries. During 1993-
1995, for example, the number of people who viewed the US as a threat increased 
from 26 to 44 percent, and that of elites from 27 to 53 percent. The number of 
people who deemed that control over Russian economy was in foreign hands 
reached 75 percent in 1995 (Tsygankov 2013, p.26). Outside Russia, Yeltsin’s 
inability to react against the enlargement of NATO to East Europe and to prevent 
emerging ethnic conflicts in CA and Caucasus, as well as Western opposite 
reactions to the expectations of Moscow altered Russian foreign policy priorities 
that soon would become consistent with Statist thinking line. Thus, then-
administration in Moscow who victimized Russian national priorities to gain 
recognition from West and failed to do so, had to make significant adjustments 
into its domestic and foreign policies. 
In general, under the identity of Westernism Moscow’s foreign policy 
sought to relieve itself from what it perceived as “burden” of CA. The reality, 
however, was opposite to Moscow’s expectations - Russia was not granted the 
status it strived for, rather Russia found itself marginalized within a unipolar 
system. Relations with CA and other post-Soviet states were not priority of 
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Moscow, within elite itself there was no accord about Russia’s CIS policy. Due to 
the domestic and external pressures and failures in foreign policy, Russia sought 
to regain its “great power” stance under Statist traditions. Next section of 
examines second period of Russian policy toward CA. 
3.3. Second period (1996-2000) 
This section examines Russian foreign policy under Eurasian identity and its 
impacts on CA in terms of security and economic cooperation. The discussion of 
the previous section shows that Russia’s efforts to embrace Western values did 
not receive recognition from the “Other”. Once Russia realized opposite Western 
reaction, the country switched its policy to traditional Statist thinking. In CA 
Russia pursued more assertive approach and thereby wanted to restore its “great 
powerness” which was weakened under Westernism policy.   
Re-establishment in Moscow’s foreign policy started after the appointment 
of Primakov as a new foreign minister. As the new foreign minister followed 
policy of restoring great power status, Russia’s foreign policy changed in 
accordance with Statist views. According to Primakov’s views, Russia was weak 
and could not have independent voice in international affairs in a unipolar world, 
and thus, Russia had to serve its own interests to become an independent power 
by proclaiming a multipolar world. Not confronting with the EU, balanced 
approach with the US and maintaining geopolitical equilibrium and resisting any 
hegemonic ambitions were the core objectives of Primakov’s policy (Tsygankov, 
2013). Such objectives required Russia to form flexible alliances in Asia and 
organize secure post-Soviet space (Tsygankov, 2013). Unlike Westernizers who 
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promoted relations with West, Statists underlined Russian interests in improving 
relationships with China and India, Middle East and reintegration of post-Soviet 
region. That is why the “Primakov doctrine” as a part of Russia’s strategy to 
regain great power prestige, involved Moscow as a center of influence over post-
Soviet space (Laruelle 2010, p.157). To achieve such goal Moscow sought to 
enhance political and economic integration within CIS. 
By the time when Primakov became a foreign minister, Russia was facing 
outside threats from instabilities and conflicts in Moldova, Caucasus and CA. In 
Primakov’s emphasis, the vital role of CA was in defending against the threat of 
radical and expansionist Islam (Lo, 2002). In addition, Kremlin sought for 
military and security cooperation with post-Soviet space. Moscow also tried to 
use its monopoly over Soviet pipelines network to transit Central Asian energy 
resources to foreign markets (Paramonov et.al, 2008). Russia, which was 
suffering from fragile economy and weak finances assumed that control over 
energy exports from CA was less costly compared to restoring full economic links 
between CA and Russia. Since the rapid privatization during shock therapy, large 
companies no longer played significant role in Moscow’s foreign policy (Laruelle 
2010, p.155). 
In general, since the mid 1990s Russian foreign policy was showing signs of 
realist stance by focusing on multilateral approach. Although Russia’s new 
balancing approach was close to realist views, one can hardly attribute such 
assertiveness to state’s material capabilities, as realists assume. The period when 
Primakov assumed his post, Russian economy had been facing sharp economic 
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crisis with average decline of 12 percent every year during 1990-1995 
(Tsygankov, 2013). What changed however, was the Russian identity of “great 
powerness”, which re-emerged under two major factors. The first was Western 
opposite attitude to Russia’s aspirations to gain the status recognition as the power 
with Western values. Second factor was liberal foreign policy’s negative effects 
on domestic economy and Russian identity (Lo, 2002). 
3.3.1. Security and military policy. 
In the second half of 1990s, Moscow acknowledged more importance to 
stability and security in CA. This happened due to increased links between 
Russian domestic extremism and external radical Islam that was arising from CA 
(Laruelle, 2008). After the defeat of Northern Alliance forces in 1996, the radical 
Islamists were almost completely controlling Afghanistan. After the withdrawal 
of Russian troops in 1995, extremists in Russia’s Chechnya were establishing 
strategic relationships with Afghan radicals (Trenin, 2007). Furthermore, radical 
groups invaded the Fergana valley, established bases there and launched regular 
attacks to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Afghan Taliban supported by Pakistan 
conquered Kabul and began to threaten Tajikistan, which was hosting Russian 
troops. In this circumstance, a natural reaction to such threats was Russia’s desire 
“to be stronger” or at least to put an end to “losing ground” everywhere, 
especially in CA (Bogaturov, 2006). Thus, given the rise of terrorist activities and 
the escalation of North Caucasus conflict, Moscow decided to eliminate 
relationships between the extremist forces operating within Russia, Afghanistan 
and some Central Asian countries. Moscow's significant achievement at that time 
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was a settlement of civil war in Tajikistan (1992-1997) by employing its 201st 
Motorized Division there. In Tajik civil war that was between de facto 
“communist” leaders and Islamist opposition Moscow embraced the former as an 
ally and Russian troops on imposed peace that gave total victory to one side and 
gave a share to the opposition in Tajik parliament (Trenin, 2007). 
Moscow’s interest in tightening security relations with post Soviet region 
had partly derived from the deterioration of Russia-NATO relations and NATO 
bombings of Belgrade in 1999. Unilateral decisions of NATO strengthened fears 
in Moscow and made Kremlin to turn to its allies in Asia, where both Russia and 
China were sharing common concerns with separatist activities (Trenin, 2007). 
3.3.2. Economic cooperation and institution building. 
Unlike his predecessor, Primakov sought to enforce domestic economy by 
reducing country’s dependence on Western financial institutions. In his thought, 
Russian had to recover its economy by supplying energy resources to world 
market. To cover its budget deficits since 1992, Russia had no option but to 
borrow from International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the negotiation process was 
usually traced with political issues (Tsygankov, 2013). 
Period of the 1990s illustrates failures in attempts to re-integrate economic 
space in ex-Soviet space. More importantly, economic activity between CIS 
members fell sharply as they saw new opportunities offered by outside parties. In 
the second half of the 1990s too there was no significant improvement in 
economic cooperation with the countries of CA. The only exception was Customs 
Union created by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan in 1998. However, 
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by that year the amount of trade between Russia and CA decreased approximately 
twofold compared to the first half of 1990s, (from USD 7.2 billion to USD 3.7 
billion).  
As mentioned above, Russia sought to use its monopoly over energy 
deliveries from CA to European markets. Kremlin tried to set control over oil and 
gas transit from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Such efforts hardly attributed to 
economic cooperation, rather to political advantages of Moscow over CA 
(Laruelle, 2010). For instance, Moscow’s efforts to block Kazakh oil exports 
during 1995, resulted foreign currency disruptions and prevented Kazakh oil 
refineries from full operation. In fact, Russia signaled Kazakhstan and its Western 
buyers that there would be no access to energy shipment unless they recognize 
Russian energy interests in the region (Blank, 1995). Similarly, Russia was 
buying and reselling Turkmen gas to Turkey at much higher prices. When 
Moscow felt competition from Western companies over Turkmen gas, Russia cut 
off Turkmenistan’s gas exports to Europe (Blank 1995, p.12-13). Moscow 
assumed that transit of Central Asian energy deposits solely through Russian 
territory and blocking the construction of pipelines bypassing Russia would 
strengthen its position in the region. 
3.3.3. Outcomes. 
In general, Russia had success in ending war in Tajikistan and preventing 
the spread of extremist movements to Russian Muslim-populated regions. 
However, Kremlin’s Central Asian foreign policy remained dubious, since official 
discourse inclined to create Euro Atlantic alliance. Moscow’s approach to 
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international relations continued to reflect an overriding Westerncentrism. As 
such, it was the result of Yeltsin administration's half-hearted attempts through 
Primakovian multipolarity, to pretend a multi-vector foreign policy, and the 
worldview of the elite remained overwhelmingly Westerncentric in practice 
(emphasis in original by Lo 2003, p.101). In terms of prioritizing foreign policy 
direction, then-Russian elite still was divided into two major groups: 
“Westernizers” and “Eurasianists”. The main contradiction occurred in defining 
whether Russia’s future and main interests lie in Europe or in Asia. In contrast to 
the supporters of Western model, Russian Eurasianists believed that Russia should 
advocate its influence in Asian continent and such division prevented a coherent 
Russian foreign policy, particularly in CA (Bogaturov, 2006; Müllerson, 2009). 
Moreover, there were some other factors that limited Russia’s attempts to recover 
its role in CA: first, most state-owned companies were privatized and state had no 
financial resources to advance its foreign policy in this region; second, Russia was 
suffering from economic crisis, which deepened in 1998. Such a weakness 
prevented Russia to give the CIS integration more economic nature. Although 
Primakovian “great power balancing” strategy received strong public support for 
its independence and concentration on security issues in former Soviet Union, it 
failed to improve the welfare of Russians (Tsygankov, 2013). Its opponents 
criticized that CIS-centered integration was heavily concentrated on security 
problems and undermined economic development and the integration process 
became too costly. 
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Meantime, external factors also reduced Kremlin’s objectives to regain its 
positions in post-Soviet territory. First reason was due to the activity of the United 
States to set up anti-Russian feelings in some post-Soviet states (Georgia, 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova). Second, due to efforts of the EU to move 
eastward and to integrate Baltic states (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia). Third, some 
other economic players such as China, Turkey, Iran and Japan became active in 
tying relationships with CA (Laruelle, 2010). Such competition over influence in 
post-Soviet republics came as a surprise for Moscow, which regarded the entire 
region as its exclusive preserve, but had no resources for much of the 1990s to 
back its claims for exclusivity within CIS (Mankoff, 2009; Trenin, 2009). 
Moscow’s another defeat became clear when the U.S. backed the construction of 
pipelines from Caspian Sea to Europe that bypassed Russia. Although Russian 
energy companies benefited in CA, they provided no support to government’s 
integration efforts there, as they did not want to supply local states with cheap 
energy in exchange of their loyalty to Moscow. 
In terms of institution building with CA, there was no serious effort and the 
cooperation was limited within CIS, which was only formal body. For instance, 
there were more than 700 hundred intra-CIS agreements. None of these 
documents seemed to work properly and they were in no way indication of 
Russia’s commitment to the CIS (Lo, 2002).  
Next section analyzes Russian foreign policy in CA within the context of 
Global War on Terror (GWOT) and “color revolutions”, as well as Russia’s 
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efforts to enforce its “great power status” through establishing security and 
integration institutions in CA. 
3.4. Third period (since 2000) 
This section argues that shifts in Russian policy towards Central were 
twofold. The first factor was Russia’s search for broader cooperation with 
Western community, including mutual actions to combat against terrorism in CA. 
The second factor was Russian perceptions that it did not receive recognition for 
offered cooperation and therefore assumed more assertive stance in CA. In other 
words, these two factors enforced contradiction in Russian feelings of Self and 
Other. Although Putin’s stance in CA was close to Primakovian “multipolar 
world” concept, the difference between those views was that Putin placed key 
emphasis on post-Soviet Eurasia’s “advantage on the scale of global economic 
competition” rather than geopolitical dimension. In Putin’s statement, no other 
state was going to fight with Russia and therefore Russia had to promote its 
economic interests and “not overstretch itself in world political affairs” 
(Tsygankov 2013, p.137). 
Fundamental shifts in Russian foreign policy became possible when Putin 
administration strengthened the institutions of Russian state and focused on 
recovering its economic power, especially by regaining government control over 
energy resources (Cooley, 2012). Coherent and articulated domestic policy, 
favorable world prices for main Russian exports (primarily oil and gas) were 
critical to manage domestic issues. Such factors allowed Russia to employ 
financial resources to realize new foreign policy objectives, to confirm its major 
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power status and defend its interests in world politics (Trenin 2007; Tsygankov 
2011). Compared to Primakov who saw CIS integration within geopolitical 
dimension, Putin wanted such integration to be consistent with Russian domestic 
economic interests and accompanied with Russia’s integration with global 
economy (Tsygankov, 2013). In 1999 speech, Putin acknowledged region's 
critical place in Russian national strategy and stated that Russia was foremost 
“Eurasian power” (Ferguson 2009, p.210). The objectives of Russian foreign 
policy became apparent as Moscow strengthened policy to recover its lost 
regional positions, primarily in the post-Soviet territory. Russian policy in CA 
after 2000s is often regarded as “resurgent” and its agenda for Central Asian 
diplomacy included cooperation on counterterrorism, gaining access to Central 
Asian resources, promoting political stability, building a common security and 
economic space (Cooley, 2012). 
3.4.1. Security and military policy. 
For Putin, the emergence of international terrorism and the need for 
cooperation against it became an agenda to foster political and security 
cooperation with the West (Lo, 2003). GWOT declared after 9/11 attacks had the 
effect on Kremlin’s calculations to accelerate its engagement especially in CA. By 
reassuring Washington in Russia’s commitment against global terror, Putin 
offered a broad set of practical measures to assist the US-led operations in 
Afghanistan and CA, including the possibility of establishing US military bases in 
CA. In this sense, some of Putin’s advisers argued that the idea of sharing 
intelligence and allowing the U.S. bases into post-Soviet space would undermine 
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Russian role in this region (Lo, 2003). However, Putin himself was decisive by 
saying that he was “more concerned with the presence of terrorist training camps 
in northern Afghanistan who send guerrillas to the Caucasus” than any possible 
“redrawing of spheres of influence” in CA (as cited in O’Loughlin et.al 2004, 
p.15). Thus, Putin went to convince Central Asian presidents to locate the U.S. 
troops in their territories. 
In doing so Putin believed, that Russian foreign policy would get multiple 
benefits. First, the U.S. forces would eradicate increasing Taliban threat that 
Moscow viewed as networking with Chechen radicals and militant groups in CA. 
Second, campaign with the U.S. in CA would allow Moscow to frame its actions 
in Chechen war as a part of campaign against global terror. Such rhetoric would 
provide strong argument that Russia and US were fighting common Islamist 
enemy. Third, campaign with the U.S. in Afghanistan would enable Russia to 
demonstrate its importance in the region as a major power. In Kremlin’s view, 
Washington would appreciate cooperation with Moscow and eventually would 
recognize Moscow as the mediator in the US-CA relations (Cooley, 2012). 
Moscow-Washington accords on the U.S. military presence in CA provoked 
regular laments from Chinese commentators. However, Russians initially counted 
on the U.S. presence there as a temporary placeholder. In Kremlin’s calculations, 
the temporary presence of the U.S. in CA would keep the region from falling into 
Beijing’s dominance, which was becoming more permanent. Moreover, the U.S. 
presence would give Moscow time to recover its strength so that it could promote 
its own interests more actively and effectively vis-à-vis China in CA (Trenin, 
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2007). It was another significant point that laid behind the ambitions of Kremlin’s 
foreign policy in CA. However, some scholars argued that it was not Putin’s 
“strategic choice”, rather it was “strategic opportunism” that Kremlin effectively 
used “an extraordinary set of circumstances” to achieve some objectives that were 
difficult to fulfill had Russia tried by its own (Lo, 2003). 
However, cooperative relationships in CA did not last long and deteriorated 
soon following disagreements in Russo-American relations. Among those were 
U.S. withdrawal from Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and deploying missile defense 
system in East Europe and decision of NATO to admit Baltic States as new 
members. In CA Washington went on enhancing bilateral relations and direct 
security cooperation with regional states individually, thereby ignoring Russia’s 
interests in the region (Cooley, 2012).  
At the same time, Russia had perceptions that “color revolutions” was 
occurring under Western rhetoric as support for democratic transformations. Such 
political turmoil happened next to Russian borders, for instance, in Georgia 
(2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005). In CA, Moscow feared that 
Washington would push Russia out from the region but could fail to do so by 
eventually leaving the region in chaos. In Kremlin, there was a conviction that 
revolutions were conspiratorial. In Kremlin’s view, upheavals had aims to topple 
Soviet-era leaders and establish pro-Western ones, thereby limiting Russian 
power in the region. At worst, in Moscow’s view Washington would export a 
revolution into Russia by establishing a “liberal-puppet regime” in Kremlin 
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(Trenin, 2009). In Moscow’s understanding, these were symptoms of Western 
rejection or Western response to the cooperation offered by Kremlin. 
In response to aggressive promotion of pro-Western regime transformations 
in post-Soviet region, Russian policy-makers took counter-measures in CA 
against revolutionary threats. Now Russia shifted its foreign policy from 
pragmatic approach to that of assertive (Tsygankov 2011; 2014). For this reason 
Moscow initiated the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a 
multilateral forum, which was transformed in 2003 from Collective Security 
Treaty under CIS. CSTO is considered the only institution with actual military 
dimension and conflict management in CA, as well as a potential tool for Russian 
planners for re-creating security dependencies with Central Asian states (Laruelle 
2010; Colley 2012). CSTO engages Russia, Armenia, Belarus and Central Asia 
(except Turkmenistan) on security issues. Uzbekistan joined CSTO in 2006, 
however terminated its membership in 2012 upon the adoption of new Foreign 
Policy Concept, which restricts Uzbekistan’s participation in any military blocs 
and deployment of any foreign military bases on its territory. Under auspices of 
CSTO Kremlin was able to revive the cooperation between military industries of 
Russia and CA. In addition, CSTO’s 2011 agreement prohibits its members to 
locate on their territories non-CSTO military units and bases without mutual 
consent. In fact, this agreement gives Moscow the right of veto over future basing 
deals in this region (Cooley, 2012, Blank 2013). In addition, Russia claimed that a 
third-party military presence would be possible if it meets Russian security 
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interest there and specifies a reasonable period for withdrawal of the potential unit 
(Trenin, 2007). 
Further, within the framework of CSTO, Moscow established its own 
airbase in Kyrgyzstan’s Kant city, in 2003. It was projected to resist expansion of 
American influence in CA and to benefit from Central Asian leaders’ 
disappointment that American presence there had not provided them more 
benefits (Mankoff, 2009). Similarly, Russia enforced its presence in CA by 
showing its support to Uzbek regime, which was under strict criticism of Western 
democracies for use of force against insurgents during Andijan massacre in May 
2005. Russia supported Uzbek government as the two signed Treaty on strategic 
cooperation in 2004, which gives each side the right to use military facilities 
located on their territories. In 2005, the two signed another agreement – Treaty on 
allied relations, which gives Uzbekistan the right to receive Russian military 
assistance in case of outside aggression.  
In 2006, Moscow signed an agreement with Bishkek, under which the latter 
would provide rent-free base exploitation in exchange for receiving Russian 
military equipment. In 2012, Russia and Kyrgyzstan signed another package of 
agreements. According to the document, Kyrgyz government prolonged rent for 
Russian military base until 2032, whereas Moscow promised $1.5 billion in 
military assistance (Engval, 2014). In addition, Moscow pledged to write off 
Kyrgyzstan’s debt, which amounted $489 million (Oliphant, 2013). 
In Tajikistan, Russian military unit that served as border guard since Soviet 
period was reduced in numbers during Yeltsin administration. However, 2012 
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agreement allowed Russia to employ its 7000-troops there for 30 years. In 
exchange, Tajikistan received $200 million worth of Russian weapons and about 
$5 million to Tajikistan’s national drug enforcement agency (Engval, 2014). Thus, 
Russia has effectively positioned itself as the regime backer against “color 
revolutions”, as well as supporter of Central Asian region security against 
radicalization and destabilization by Islamists. In general, these efforts show how 
Moscow under Statist foreign policy tried to restore its image of “great 
powerness” once its Self received ignorance from Western community. Next 
section discusses Russia’s energy interests and explains how Moscow sought to 
restore its monopoly over the energy of CA. 
3.4.2. Energy policy. 
Along with security policy, Moscow has been striving to enhance its 
influence through energy cooperation and institution building in CA. Since 2000, 
cooperation in energy sector with CA is another aspect where Russian foreign 
policy has reached notable results compared to mid-1990s. Stable and secure 
access to CA’s energy deposits for Russian energy companies and transit of 
resources through Russia’s territory have been priorities for Kremlin’s policy in 
CA. 
Due to Kazakhstan’s biggest ownership of Caspian oil reserves, Moscow is 
striving to increase the access of Russian companies in oil production of 
Kazakhstan. In doing so Moscow’s primary concern has been to prevent 
construction of any pipelines from CA to Europe that would transit energy 
bypassing Russian territory. In order to get control over oil exports, Moscow 
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sought to increase the shipment of Kazakh oil through Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium (CPC) from 28 million to 67 million tons annually. However, the 
expectation was not realized as Kazakhstan decided to diversify its oil exports to 
Europe via Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (20 million tons), which is the 
competitor of CPC. Later in 2005, Kazakhstan opened another pipeline, which 
pumps its oil to China’s Xinjiang province. Moreover, Moscow’s price policy on 
oil transits for Kazakh oil companies, that pay as twice much as those of Russian, 
gave another impetus for Kazakhstan to diversify its oil exports (Trenin, 2007).  
Although, Russia owns enormous gas reserves, its deposits are located in 
distant regions, so that the exploitation of those reserves becomes too costly. In 
order to satisfy its foreign contract obligations, Russian Gazprom has to buy 
additional gas from CA. For this reason Kremlin decided to tie Turkmenistan’s 
gas to Russia, keeping Turkmen gas market from other potential competitors. In 
2003, Russia’s Gazprom signed an agreement with Turkmenistan, which provides 
Gazprom with monopoly over purchasing Turkmen gas around 80 billion cubic 
meter (bcm) annually and the right to re-export this gas to Europe (Laruelle, 
2008). In doing so Moscow was successful to prevent the direct deal between 
Turkmenistan and Ukraine, which makes the latter dependent on Moscow for 
energy supplies (Trenin, 2007). In 2007, Kremlin’s energy diplomacy was 
successful in reaching a contract with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on new 
pipeline construction passing alongside of the Caspian Sea. This agreement would 
give Moscow more chance to monopolize the export of gas from CA and reduce 
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the influence of European and American projects such as Trans-Caspian pipeline 
(Laruelle, 2008). 
In addition to competition from Western companies over Caspian oil, 
Moscow faces competition from China over access for gas in CA. As mentioned 
above, Moscow’s aim has been to prevent the construction of any additional 
pipelines from Turkmenistan to Europe and ensure transit of Turkmen gas 
exclusively through Russian territory. To some extent, Moscow realized this aim 
when it achieved an agreement with Ashgabat in 2005 on purchasing gas for the 
next twenty-five years. However, Moscow accepted silently the fact that China 
also entered into gas market in CA and constructed its own pipeline from 
Turkmenistan. For Moscow, it seems preferable to see China in Turkmen gas 
market, rather than allowing Western energy companies to pull out gas purchases 
from Kremlin’s control. Moscow is seemingly better off from allowing China in, 
while Western companies out from Turkmen gas market, because such 
arrangement gives Moscow advantage in keeping European market dependent on 
Russia-led pipelines (Blank, 2013). 
By 2006, Russia was the main trading partner of both Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan. Trade between Russia and Kazakhstan valued $10 billion, while 
Russian-Uzbek trade was close to $ 3 billion, which represented more than a 
quarter of Uzbekistan’s total foreign trade. Increased trade volume between 
Russia and these two countries was due to the gas and oil exports. The share of 
hydrocarbons in Central Asian total exports to Russia in 2003 represented 32 
percent, and reached 56 percent in 2006 (Paramonov et al, 2008). In 2011, overall 
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trade turnover between Russia and CA was $27,3 billion, and the pattern of trade 
did not change significantly. The main export products to Russia are still raw 
materials and energy resources, whereas Russian exports to CA are manufactured 
goods (Oliphant, 2013). Next session explains Moscow’s achievements in the 
sphere of institution building 
3.4.3. Institution building. 
Since the Primakovian era, the idea to create an integration process within 
post-Soviet space has been critical for Russian leaders. The first step of 
integration established Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) between Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia. EEC was to facilitate the process 
of creation of Customs Union and Single Economic Space between members. 
After successful establishment of Customs Union in 2010 and Single Economic 
Space in 2014, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia launched EEU, which 
has merged its successor EEC in January 2015. As such, creation of the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU) and its component Customs Union has been “flagship” 
under Putin administration (Weitz, 2014). Kyrgyzstan is the member of EEU 
since August 2015, while Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are not members yet. 
Since the announcement the creation of EEU, there emerged debates 
warning on Russia’s neo-imperial ambitions in “re-Sovietizing of region” (Weitz, 
2014). To some extent, such skepticism seems has a ground to exist. If it is true, 
such ambitions can be related to views that prompt Russia to establish exclusive 
sphere of influence. It appears that under current leadership such views has been 
marginal and Russian elite hardly wants to return to imperial mode, rather than to 
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consolidate power in Russian “sphere of privileged interests” (Tsygankov 2013; 
Cohen 2013). 
The process of integration into a certain space has both advantages and 
constraints. The skeptics of integration within post-Soviet space state that Russia 
dominates the decision-making process in Customs Union of EEU. They point to 
unequally distribution of votes that favors Moscow. On the other side, there are 
proponents of integration, who argue that it might be favorable for landlocked 
countries of CA, so their goods and services can access bigger markets of member 
states. Some others say that Putin’s policies towards Asia are pragmatic and best 
understood as serving the purpose of modernizing Russia’s economy, rather than 
developing strategic alliances or deep cultural affinities (Tsygankov, 2013). Also, 
there is an argument that Russia does not aim to build a Eurasian super state or 
another version of Russian empire, yet Moscow wants to ensure favorable 
conditions for economic expansion in former borderlands and high degree of 
political influence, which guarantees loyalty from local states (Trenin, 2007, 
Blank 2013). One may consider cases showing that Moscow’s integration 
intentions are pragmatic, rather than imperialistic. For example, Kyrgyzstan’s 
entry to the EEU gives more privileges for Kyrgyz workers in Russia, simplifying 
the procedures for receiving documents for the status of migrant. The removal of 
customs and administrative barriers for trading within EEU gives more incentives 
for Kyrgyz business. Another example is that, after the meeting between Putin 
and Karimov in Tashkent, December 2014, Moscow agreed to write-off 
Tashkent’s debt of $890 million in exchange to create a free-trade zone between 
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Uzbekistan and EEU by 2018. In addition, Russia and Kazakhstan established a 
special assistance fund of $10 billion that can be used as assistance for new 
members of EEU in order to foster their integration within the institution. It is 
unlikely that Kremlin simply forces local countries to join Moscow-led regional 
projects; rather it offers to do so by seemingly “win-win” formula. 
3.5. Conclusion 
Since the early post-Soviet period until recent times, Russian policy towards 
CA has undergone three main shifts. Since the collapse of Soviet Union, Russia 
under liberal Westernizers sought to integrate itself into Western system of values 
and thereby acquire Western recognition for its aspirations. In order to achieve 
that objective Kremlin decided that Russia had to relieve itself from the post-
Soviet burden and therefore ignored relations with post-Soviet republics. 
Although Kremlin was claiming that CIS was priority, it did not have any 
coherent policy towards CIS. Soon after Moscow found itself within both 
domestic and external problems and it became clear that Moscow’s early 
Westernization strategy was miscalculated. Russia then tried to revive its both 
domestic and international stance under Statists who perceived world through 
balancing against Western hegemony and promoting multipolar system. In such 
conditions, Moscow sought to build alliances in Asia and regain its influence in 
post-Soviet space, particularly in CA, which was lost under Westernist foreign 
policy. However, this policy overly concentrated on geopolitical calculations and 
became too distant from dealing with domestic issues of Russia. The results came 
to show that Primakovian great balancing approach was too expensive for Russia, 
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who was already in economic crisis. Although Putin’s vision had some 
similarities with previous strategy, his approach received pragmatic stance. Main 
shift under Putin is that Moscow no longer considers CA region as “all-inclusive 
and exclusive sphere of influence” as notion from Soviet times, instead CA serves 
as the zone of “interests” which is more specific and identifiable (Trenin, 2009). 
Kremlin’s current approach to CA is realistic enough to recognize the local states’ 
links with outside players. Russia accepts foreign investment and economic 
competition in CA. What it wants now is to make sure that its interests in CA 
prevail and it aims to construct kind of “protective integration” that serves its 
interests in creating a multipolar world. One of the highlights of the Russian 
foreign policy strategy is to maintain the status of a great power, recovery of lost 
economic and geopolitical advantages after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Promotion of such initiatives is mostly to maintain Russia’s leading role and 
interests in the region, which it views as “backyard”, rather than recreating in any 
form of a single state. 
As the theory of identity predicts, relationships between Self and Other are 
based on their perception of each other. The characteristic of their relationships 
depends on the extent to which Self receives recognition from Other. The 
discussion showed that relationships between Russia and Western community has 
been both cooperative and conflictual. Depending on these perceptions, Moscow’s 
foreign policy in CA has been either ignorant or assertive. By maintaining the 
capability of power projection in CA, Russia’s Self has been striving for the 
recognition from the West.    
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CHAPTER FOUR: GRAND STRATEGY OF CHINA AND ITS 
FOREIGN POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA 
Some scholars argue that initial relations between China and Central Asia 
(CA) dates back to 138 BC when Chinese Han dynasty sent its envoy to CA for 
making alliance against Hun nomads who lived in Northern China (Zhao, 2016). 
Since then China and CA maintained long time political, economic and cultural 
relations mostly through Silk Road. Relations between the two disrupted in 
nineteenth century when CA became an integral part of the Russian Empire and 
later Soviet Union. For over last century China perceived the region only in the 
context of Sino-Russian and Sino-Soviet relations. Due to Moscow’s tight control 
over political relationships within the region, during Soviet times China-CA 
relationships were almost non-existent. The breakup of Soviet Union has changed 
geopolitical order in CA, too. In the order that they emerged, new republics in CA 
did not have independent statehood before the Soviet Union. In addition to the 
altered geopolitical order in CA, the loss of region’s patron led to the intra-
regional issues such as economic crisis and religious radicalism. Rising 
geopolitical importance and regional issues of CA altered China’s concerns about 
this region. Since the independence of the region, China has been mainly 
interested in maintaining border security and combatting religious radicalism. 
Eventually however, China manifested itself as an important player in the region 
in maintaining regional security and economic development. China also could 
develop the network of gas and oil pipelines that ships energy resources from CA 
to Western China. Moreover, Beijing successfully institutionalized its engagement 
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in the regional affairs through Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). So far, 
Beijing could establish itself as a major actor in CA without threatening its 
relations with Moscow, who considers CA vital for its own ambitions. In general, 
Soviet Union’s dissolution required China to develop entirely new policy in CA. 
Objectives of its policy has been to prevent new threats and employ new 
opportunities in this region. The main argument of this chapter is that now CA has 
become important for China’s grand strategy. In chronological order, this chapter 
explains how Beijing has been realizing foreign policy towards CA. The chapter 
is developed throughout the discussion of three main periods and each period is 
comprised of sections that cover various aspects of Chinese policy in CA such as 
security, economic and energy policies. 
The reason for focusing on grand strategy framework is due to the absence 
of officially issued document that specifies Beijing’s diplomatic strategy and 
gives a systematic explanation of its approach in regards to CA. This estimate 
makes China’s involvement in CA somewhat hypothetical; therefore, China’s 
policy towards CA is best explained by focusing on Beijing’s overall strategy 
(Zhao, 2007). 
The remainder of this section outlines theoretical framework and then 
provides empirical study.  
4.1. Theory of grand strategy 
Theory of grand strategy explains how state uses military, political and 
economic means to reach its objectives or ends in setting of independent choice 
within the constraints of international system (Goldstein 2003, 2005). 
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Traditionally the notion of strategy along with that of tactics mostly referred to 
military actions of states. In words of Clausewitz “Tactics is the art of using 
troops in battle; strategy is the art of using battles to win the wars” (as cited in 
Kennedy 1991, p.1). Later strategists differentiated strategy from traditional 
understanding that viewed it as an instrument of warfare. They analyzed and 
explained strategy at grand levels and argued that states design strategies not only 
to win warfare, but also to maintain long-term peace. For instance, Edward Earle 
– one the founders of modern grand strategy theory, noted that “...as war and 
society have become more complicated, strategy has of necessity required 
increasing consideration of nonmilitary factors, economic, psychological, moral, 
political, and technological. Strategy, therefore is not merely a concept of 
wartime, but it is inherent element of statecraft at all times” (as cited in Martel 
2015, p.26). In this sense, grand strategy implies to the policy, which employs all 
military and nonmilitary elements ensuring the preservation and enhancement of 
nation’s long-term interests given both domestic and international constraints 
(Kennedy, 1991; Rosecrance & Stein, 1993). More precisely, grand strategy is the 
art of conforming desired ends and available means (Feaver, 2009). Grand 
strategy is the collection of plans and policies that includes state’s purposeful 
efforts to employ political, military, diplomatic, and economic means together to 
realize that state’s national interest (Feaver, 2009). It is also important that grand 
strategies are formed based on deliberate actions – what leader recognizes as 
constraints while making calculations and what are leader’s feelings that shape his 
worldview (Feaver, 2009). 
	 71 
One of the most recent accounts suggests that grand strategy is the “multi-
level plan” of different elements, such as concepts and distinct policies, which 
should interact in a coherent way. Each of these elements under different temporal 
scope (short-term to mid-term) serves to reach state’s highest political end in the 
long-term (Martel 2015, p.30). States must articulate their strategies according to 
the unity of their objectives so that the realization of the strategy should maintain 
the peaceful environment and lead the state towards the most favorable outcomes 
in its foreign and domestic policies (Kennedy, 1991). Yet, why do states need a 
grand strategy? To formulate the answer to such question, one should keep in 
mind that grand strategy carries out state’s long-term objectives and can be 
understood in terms of what it should accomplish (Martel, 2015). Thus, states 
need grand strategy not only to develop plans for short run perspective, but states 
do so in the context of systemic pressures where they must foresee possible 
responses of other actors, whose actions may oppose or facilitate their efforts in 
the long-term (Goldstein 2005, p.18). Foreign policy in its turn, realizes state’s 
principal and highest objectives defined and articulated by its grand strategy 
(Martel 2015, p.30). Thus, the above-developed discussion leads us to five general 
features of grand strategy (Finklestein 2009, p.1-2): 
- First, strategies are designed to obtain defined aims in specific 
circumstances 
- Second, strategies need the development of “ways” (concepts, approaches 
and distinct policies) to achieve those objectives 
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- Third, strategies require the development of “means” (capacity) to make 
those policies and concepts operate and support them 
- Fourth, strategies need coordination of “ways” and “means” to achieve 
desirable ends. Without well-established coordination, the strategy is likely to fail 
- Fifth, strategies must adjust once circumstances change or when 
approaches prove ineffective and means become insufficient. 
4.1.2. The grand strategy of China. 
China’s foreign policy is critical tool to the realization of its grand strategy, 
which ensures China’s rise to great power stance within the uncertainties of 
international relations (Goldstein, 2003). The core objective of its grand strategy 
is to maintain the environment necessary to China’s economic and military 
modernization. Moreover, it is designed to prevent the establishment of anti-
Chinese opposition by states that view China’s current increasing capabilities as 
threat that must be opposed (Goldstein, 2003; Medeiros, 2009). The grand 
strategy of China is composed of two components. The one is diplomacy which 
focuses on building relationships with major actors, and works so that these 
relations make China essential participant of international system and whose 
interests cannot be ignored by other key players. The second element is an 
international “activist agenda” that provides China with the reputation of 
responsible member of international community and prevents states to join 
coalitions against China (Goldstein, 2005; Medeiros, 2009). 
In general, grand strategy as an “end-ways-means equation” is coordination 
of the ways (concepts, approaches, policies) and capacities (means) designed to 
	 73 
achieve specific objectives (ends) in a specific and often changing circumstances 
(Finkelstein, 2009). Concerning the ends of China's grand strategy, there is a 
consensus that Beijing seeks three main strategic objectives. The first objective is 
to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The second is to promote 
economic and military modernization as core drivers behind its “comprehensive 
national strength”. The third aim is to earn international respect and maximize, or 
at least maintain status as a great power (Medeiros 2009, xvi; Heilman & Schmidt 
2014, p.9). “Peaceful development”, “win-win solutions”, “harmony and 
diversity” are concepts of China’s strategy (Cabestan, 2010). By following them 
China wants to allay perceptions of “China threat” among its neighbors, 
particularly in CA. China tries to assure local states that it does not seek to 
interfere in domestic affairs and its growth will not undermine neighbors’ 
economic and security interests (Medeiros, 2009; Cabestan, 2010). At the same 
time, China wants to convince Russia that Beijing has no intention to a hegemonic 
role and it recognizes Moscow’s privileged stance in CA (Cooley 2012; Weitz 
2013). Beijing prefers cooperation rather than confrontation with Moscow in CA 
and therefore seeks not to provoke any discontent in Moscow (Zhao, 2007). These 
are the manifestation of how above mentioned two elements of Beijing’s strategy 
work in CA – dealing with major powers and yielding the reputation of important 
partner. 
Concerning China’s primary objectives in CA, scholars and experts propose 
different opinions. Some scholars argue that China’s primary interest is to ensure 
security and stability of Xinjiang, which neighbors with CA (Clarke 2010, Blank 
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2010). Some others claim that China is foremost interested in energy of CA. 
However, there is a broad consensus among them that China’s policy in CA is the 
reflection of its strategy to global world (Kuchera, 2012). In sum, CA is important 
for China and its grand strategy for several reasons. First, cooperation with CA 
gives China opportunities to overcome internal constraints of territorial integrity 
and domestic security of Xinjiang. By promoting economic cooperation between 
its Muslim populated provinces and CA, China wants to alleviate concerns 
emanating from Muslim minorities, who historically regard themselves as 
independent nationalities. Second, CA is strategically important as it provides 
China with an alternative ground route to maintain trade relations with Europe – 
Beijing’s largest trade partner. The route is designed to stimulate trade between 
China’s relatively less developed Western periphery and Europe through CA, 
thereby fostering development of peripheral provinces. Stability in CA is of 
strategic importance for China; the more stable CA the more chances for China to 
concentrate on other primary concerns (Zhao, 2016). At the same time, for China, 
CA is important source of energy resources and relatively safe route that reduces 
Beijing’s dependence on risky sea routes to transit oil and gas from Middle East 
and Africa. Moreover, China’s CA policy through the framework of SCO is a 
manifestation that Beijing no longer merely reacts to the external environment, 
rather it shows Beijing’s efforts to shape external environment (Finkelstein, 
2009). Finally, the degree of Sino-Russian mutual understanding in CA is likely 
to affect overall strategic partnership between China and Russia (Zhao, 2016). 
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Remainder of the chapter analyzes China’s diplomacy in CA through three 
main stages. First stage covers the beginning of the 1990s. This period has 
associations with settlement of border problems inherited from the Sino-Soviet 
relations. Second phase includes the mid and late 1990s and 2000s and 
characterizes the formation of regional mechanisms and institutions in CA with 
the participation of Beijing, as well as the expansion of China's economic 
presence. Third phase begins after 9/11 events. This stage shows unprecedented 
increased activity and assertiveness of Chinese foreign policy in CA. During this 
period, China has become source of financial aid and investments for some 
countries in CA. 
4.2. First phase (1991-1996) 
This section explains the early security issues such as settlement of border 
disputes between China and its CA neighbors, the emergence of “East Turkestan 
Movement” in Xinjiang and China’s efforts to cooperate over these problems. 
In the early 1990s, China faced a number of challenges for its domestic and 
foreign policy. Frosty relations with the West after Tiananmen Square events in 
1989, the fall of communist regimes in Eastern countries of Europe, particularly 
territorial dissolution of Soviet Union and the death of communist regime in 
Moscow threatened Beijing (Scobel, Ratner & Beckley, 2014). Therefore, the 
main purpose of Beijing's foreign policy in the early 1990s was to create the 
“zone of stability” along China's borders in order to ensure security of political 
regime, the success of the Chinese reforms and domestic integrity. Stability in CA 
is vital for China, so that any instability in the region could spill over to China’s 
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Xinjiang and Uighur riots could use CA to prepare attacks on China. At the same 
time, China was not too reactive with respect to the internal events in CA and 
took the time until the situation in the region becomes clear, so that Beijing’s 
decisions would be less cost-effective under uncertainties (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 
2009). 
The unexpected appearance of new independent states next to China’s 
borders and negligence of those states by Russia became a complete surprise to 
Beijing (Swaström, 2011). Civil war in Tajikistan (1992-1997) and instability in 
neighboring Afghanistan predefined China’s primary strategic interest until 1997. 
Primary objective of China was to maintain security and stability along its borders 
with CA (Zhao, 2016). Therefore, China sought focus on the settlement of border 
issues that Sino-Soviet relations had been unable to solve. 
At the same time, the linkages between extremist Uighur Diasporas that live 
both inside and outside of China (mainly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) were 
increasing significantly. China wanted assurances from new states in CA that they 
would not be home to extremist groups that could support Uighur separatist 
movements in Xinjiang province (Lanteigne, 2010). 
4.2.1. Uighur separatism in Xinjiang and search for security 
cooperation. 
Soon after establishing diplomatic relations with new states in CA, in 1992 
Beijing initiated negotiations over issues such as high-level military presence 
along borders, trans-border disputes and Uighur separatism. 
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The most important aspect of China’s internal security is intertwined with 
Uighur minorities in its Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Province (XUAR), which 
has borders and historically close relationships with CA. For China, the issue has 
existential concern because it derives from the aspiration of ethnic minorities in 
XUAR to revive their independent state - the so-called East Turkestan. XUAR has 
always been home to secessionist, rebellious forces and caused problems for 
China’s integrity since the Han Dynasty (Fravel, 2008). This issue strongly affects 
the perception in Beijing that continued rule of China’s Communist Party (CCP) 
is indivisible from unity and territorial integrity of China. Its leadership is 
seriously concerned about unrest and pursuit of independence by ethnic minorities 
who live in remote and economically backward Western provinces (Scobel, 
Ratner & Beckley, 2014). 
Russian expeditors first used the term of “East Turkestan” in the mid 
eighteenth century to distinguish the parts of CA belonging to China. The rest of 
CA was called “West Turkestan” (Zhao, 2007). Until the seizure of East 
Turkestan by Qing dynasty in the eighteenth century, each part existed integrally 
under Turkic khanate since 7-8th centuries (Eivazov, 2010). 
As a modern movement, “East Turkestan” first appeared in early 1900s. In 
1933 there was initial attempt to establish East Turkestan Republic on the basis of 
Sharia laws and the movement was significantly influenced by Pan-Islamism and 
Pan-Turkism ideologies of that period (Zhao, 2016). Soviet leadership, who tried 
to reunite East Turkestan with the rest of CA, supported the second attempt. In 
1944, Uighur rebellions proclaimed East Turkestan Republic in Xinjiang. The 
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state existed until Soviet government suspended its support in June 1946 (Zhao, 
2016). Eventually, Xinjiang was reverted under the authority of Chinese central 
government in 1949. Since then, the central political objective of “East Turkestan 
Movement” has been to establish an independent state in Xinjiang by causing 
violence and terrorist movements.  
China’s Xinjiang, the population of which is constituted of Turkic Muslim 
Uighurs (42 percent) and Chinese Han people (39 percent), is probably the most 
vulnerable province to separatists and radical Islamist groups (Harris 2014, p.86). 
Total number of Uighur diaspora is estimated around 11 million people, majority 
of them i.e. 10 million live in XUAR, whereas between 300,000 to 1 million 
Uighurs live in CA (Scobel, Ratner & Beckley 2014, p.9). 
Anti-government sentiments, terrorist-style attacks and armed conflicts 
between insurgent groups and government forces in Xinjiang were spreading 
significantly since Tiananmen events in 1989. Dissolution of Soviet Union and 
emergence of new independent states in CA to some extent intensified those 
movements, so that Uighurs living in and outside Xinjiang were inspired by the 
possibility to establish their own independent “East Turkistan” state (Dwivedi, 
2006; Fravel, 2008). Moreover, by 1990s radical groups settled in some parts of 
CA were actively supporting their members in Xinjiang through ideological 
literatures and financial resources that were delivered from countries abroad. 
During his visit to Xinjiang in 1990, Jiang Zemin warned about external threats to 
region’s stability and stated “stability and calm in Xinjiang will have a decisive 
influence on the stability of entire nation” (as cited in Fravel 2008, p.155). In 
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terms of external support, Turkey was considered as one of the most important 
centers for Uighur diaspora and source of funding for separatist activities in 
Xinjiang (Eivazov, 2010). World Uighur Congress, after its meeting held in 
Istanbul in December 1992, decided to provide East Turkestan Movement (ETM) 
with arms, as well. The considerable portion of arms transit came through the 
territory of CA republics (Paramanov et al, 2008). Therefore, maintaining stability 
in Xinjiang and settlement of border issues with states in CA were primary 
concerns for China. 
4.2.2. Territorial and border disputes settlement. 
Decisions between China and its CA neighbors over territorial disputes were 
made through bilateral meetings. At the working level, sides used joint 
delegations format, which included Russian representatives, too. The reason for 
that was that the Russian troops were still allocated along borders in CA and 
Russian experts possessed expertise and historical knowledge on current borders, 
which historically were part of Sino-Soviet borderlands (Zhao, 2007; Fravel, 
2008). 
In case of negotiations over border security and acceptable demarcation 
lines between China and its neighbors in CA (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan), Beijing adhered flexible positions, notably with Tajikistan. Border 
negotiations between China and Tajikistan included three disputed sectors, the 
longest of which along with the Pamir Mountains. Then ongoing then civil war in 
Tajikistan postponed first negotiations until 1997. Talks over the status of Pamir 
Mountains on Sino-Tajik border ended as the two neighbors signed a bilateral 
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agreement in 2002. According to this agreement, Tajikistan ceded 1000 square 
kilometers (sq.km.) (Dwivedi 2006, p.147), while Beijing agreed on significant 
concessions and accepted to keep only 4 percent of more than 28,000 sq.km of 
disputed area (Lanteigne 2010, p.168; Fravel 2008, p.164-166). At the same time, 
the two assured to support each other against national splitters and religious 
extremism. 
Between China and Kazakhstan, there were approximately 2,240 sq.km. of 
disputed territory. The fact that Kazakhstan is China’s most Uighur populated 
neighbor and has 1,740 sq.km long borderline with Xinjiang was critical for 
Beijing to secure its Western province. The two sides fully resolved all disputes 
by signing three boundary agreements. In addition to border settlements, both 
states claimed strong support to each other and accepted mutual measures against 
the spread of separatists and radical groups. In general, China made considerable 
concessions and received only approximately 34 percent of the claimed land 
(Fravel 2008, p.160-163). 
Disputed area between China and Kyrgyzstan included 3,656 sq.km, with 
the majority being under the latter’s control. First boundary agreement of 1996 
resolved six out of seven disputed sectors. Additional boundary agreement signed 
in August 1999 settled the last sector of dispute. As in the case with Kazakhstan, 
here too, China decided to compromise, and received only about 1,208 sq.km or 
32 percent of all claimed land (Fravel 2008, p.163-164). These examples explain 
China’s flexibility on trading its concessions over border disputes. It has been 
Beijing’s direct strategy to make concessions in exchange for the acceptance of 
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China’s demands by its neighbors in CA. In doing so China sought to prevent the 
spread of radical groups and limit external support for separatists in Xinjiang from 
the territories of neighboring countries (Fravel 2008, p.151; Swanström 2011, 
p.6). Leadership in Beijing believed that internal threat of separatism and the need 
to integrate weak economy of Xinjiang as the central part of Eurasia outweighs 
the value of contested land. 
To facilitate further border talks, the members of joint delegation sought to 
institutionalize their meetings. The idea came to power during the meeting in 
Shanghai, where China’s neighbors in CA, in part to suppress region’s own 
separatist sentiments, showed their renewed support for Chinese policies in 
Xinjiang (Sheives, 2006). In April 1996 China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan signed the Treaty on deepening military trust in border regions. 
This treaty established “Shanghai Five” group. The “Shanghai Five” agreement 
was significant to loosen military posture along the borders and to resolve 
pending disagreements between members (Sheives, 2006). In addition, the 
agreement opened the door for China’s multilateral engagement in CA (Zhao, 
2016). Soon after, based on “Shanghai Five” treaty, members established Mutual 
Military Confidence-Building Measures (MMCBM), which prohibited 
provocative military exercises along borders. The members agreed on strategic-
information sharing and intensifying military contacts. These two agreements are 
of key significance in guaranteeing security of 7,300 km. long borders between 
China, Russia and the CA states. Moreover, these agreements enabled China to 
focus more on economic cooperation (Zhao, 2007).  
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In 1999, the five countries established a joint verification team to observe 
force reductions along the borders and to monitor confidence-building relations. 
This group promoted further bilateral Sino-Russian military contacts, including 
inspections and Beijing’s arm purchases from Russia. These Sino-Russian accords 
provided mutually beneficial effects such as minimizing pressures on their long-
disputed borders and enhancing both states’ diplomatic and persuasive influence 
in CA (Lanteigne, 2010). Next section discusses initial economic relations 
between China and CA. 
4.2.3. Economic cooperation. 
Prior to the dismemberment of Soviet Union, the trade relations between 
Chinese border provinces and Soviet republics in CA were nonexistent due to the 
strict control over Sino-Soviet borders. Although there were some tentative trade 
agreements between China’s XUAR and Soviet republics in CA, no single trade 
route between them was established; the inhabitants of borders towns who wanted 
to cross the borders were required special permits and were objected to strong 
controls; both Russian and Chinese administrations regarded them as disloyal 
(Peyrouse, 2007). During the era of Mao, government considered Xinjiang as an 
impediment to Beijing’s integration objectives. On the one hand, it was due to 
Xinjiang’s remoteness from Chinese heartland. On the other hand, it was because 
of historical and cultural proximity that linked Uighurs in Xinjiang and other 
Muslims in CA. Therefore, Mao’s government sought to integrate Xinjiang by 
isolating it from economic and cultural relationships with CA (Clarke, 2010b). 
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In contrast to his predecessor’s policy, Deng initiated “reforms and opening 
up policy” and Xinjiang no longer was an obstacle to integration, rather the 
province became an important instrument to achieve it (Clarke, 2010b). In 1992, 
Xinjiang was included in China’s “opening up” national campaign. The same year 
China and Kazakhstan established a border post that facilitated relations for 
traders. Cross-border trade with cheap consumer goods became a primordial 
cooperation with neighboring countries and shuttle trade turned to a source of 
income for Chinese Uighurs. By 1995, the overall trade volume between China 
and CA states accounted approximately $490 million (Paramonov et al 2008, 
p.45). By providing more economic incentives to local ethnic people, Beijing 
sought to sustain its control over borderlands occupied by ethnic minorities, over 
whom no Chinese empire had direct control in the past. At the same time, by 
providing more economic incentives, Beijing wanted to improve relations 
between Han and non-Han people (Fravel 2008, p.6, p.157). In Xinjiang, for 
instance, Beijing’s pursuit for the policy of integration aims not only to 
incorporate region’s non-Han people into the “unitary, multi-ethnic” Chinese 
state, but also drives Chinese policy for broader involvement in CA (Clarke, 
2010b). Mutual visa exemption at that time was another factor that intensified the 
border trade and alleviated travels for traders. During economic difficulties 
triggered by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, cheap consumer goods from 
China became the main source for daily consumption in CA. Such massive spread 
of cheap goods in CA provided unexpected political effects and later would 
become a sign of China’s presence in CA (Zhao, 2007). Although by early 1990s 
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China did not have any coherent economic policy towards CA, Beijing’s primary 
goal at the long-term would be to transform Xinjiang into a “Eurasian Continental 
Bridge” by promoting economic cooperation with neighboring countries, 
investing in infrastructure projects and fully developing region’s capabilities 
(Clarke 2010, p.137). 
In resolving the disputes, despite its relatively strong position comparing to 
those of newly emerged republics in CA, China adhered cooperative and flexible 
stance, rather than strict behavior. In exchange for such cooperative stance, China 
sought assurance that its neighbors would fight against radicals who supported 
rebellions in Xinjiang. More importantly, China and its CA neighbors reached 
several important agreements that prohibited the provocative employment of 
troops along their mutual borderlines. The countries established grouping that 
monitored the implementation of agreements thereby enhancing mutual trust 
between signatories. In terms of economic cooperation, although between China 
and CA there were no trade patterns during Sino-Soviet relations, China was able 
establish trade relations with new states in CA. Eventually, cheap consumer goods 
turned the source of income for Chinese Uighurs, who benefited shuttle trade 
between Xinjiang and CA. 
4.3. Second phase (1997-2001) 
Despite notable achievements in border issues settlement, China continued 
to take further steps in security management in CA. Within this period, China 
took leadership in establishing regional institution to fight against “three evils”. In 
addition to security measures, China became a major player in economic relations. 
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This section turns to the discussion of China’s policy to fulfill above-mentioned 
steps. 
In the second half of 1990s, there were two major impacts on China’s 
foreign policy shift. The first was threat of increasing terrorism to China’s 
Western borders from CA, where weak regional states were facing increased 
activity of religious extremist and terrorist organizations. Particular concern for 
Beijing was the growth of Uighur separatism. Uighur extremist structures became 
broader; they were establishing links with Al-Qaeda and receiving support from 
radicals in CA (Müllerson, 2013). Second factor was energy resources. Gas and 
oil reserves confirmed in the Caspian Sea and CA increased the value of the 
region in terms of energy cooperation. Given the growing needs of the Chinese 
economy for raw materials, Beijing sought to diversify its energy supplies from 
CA. Moreover, China hoped to implement the national program stimulating 
economic growth of Western regions and CA would become attractive market for 
Chinese products. 
4.3.1. Security cooperation. 
Although cooperation over borders demilitarization and confidence-building 
mechanisms were successful, Afghanistan, where Taliban forces began to export 
extremist ideologies throughout the region, was another threat in the region 
(Lanteigne, 2010). Additionally, Beijing was aware about growing linkages 
between Uighur separatists and other radical groups within the region of CA 
(Swanström, 2011). For instance, vice-premier of State Council of China in 
November 2000 stated that around one thousand Chinese Muslims were trained in 
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Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. After returning to Xinjiang, they 
were engaged in rebellions against Chinese authorities, as well as acted as 
instructors in training camps created in remote areas of China (Eivazov, 2010). 
Furthermore, during 1996-2000 CA became home to various extremist 
groups such as Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Islamic Party of 
Turkestan (IPT) and Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT). After series of bombings by these 
groups in Uzbekistan in February 1999, invasions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan 
in August 1999, August 2000 and July 2001, the waves of violence moved to 
China’s Xinjiang. The members of IMU and HuT claimed their objective to 
topple the secular regimes and to establish an Islamic Caliphate in CA that would 
include Xinjiang, too (Dwivedi, 2006). The incidents in CA followed by unrest 
and violations in neighboring Xinjiang. Although Chinese government blamed 
“hostile foreign forces” in destabilizing China’s borders, series of uprisings and 
bombings in Xinjiang were partly the results of domestic problems related to 
“Strike hard” government campaign launched in 1996. The campaign’s primary 
goal was to fight against “illegal religious activities”. It also supported migration 
of Han Chinese into Xinjiang and increased control over free religious and 
cultural expressions of minorities and caused massive arrests of suspected 
separatists (Clarke, 2010; Fravel 2008). Beijing’s efforts to assimilate Han and 
non-Han people focused on the policy of “the three inseparable ties” which meant 
“the Han Chinese cannot live without the minority groups, that the minority 
groups cannot live without the Han Chinese, and that no one minority group can 
live without the other minority groups” (as cited in Cooley 2012, p.76). 
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Meanwhile, Russia’s Chechnya also became space for separatist and 
extremist groups that had loose alliance with Afghan Taliban and radicals in CA 
(Trenin, 2007). To legitimize its actions in Chechen War, Moscow was seeking 
cooperation from republics in CA in exchange for Kremlin’s backing of their 
struggle against Islamists in the region (Laruelle, 2008). 
In 1998, members of “Shanghai Five” and Uzbekistan as an observer in this 
group, for the first time released joint statement and claimed that none of them 
would allow to use their territories for actions to damage the sovereignty, security 
and social order of another member (Zhao 2007, p.141). However, 
notwithstanding mutual efforts, Uighur radicals organized series of assassinations 
in Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000 that killed some Chinese officials and Han people 
(Clarke, 2010). These incidents urged China to demand even closer security 
cooperation between members to fight against what Beijing called “three evils” 
(terrorism, separatism and extremism). In June 2001, “Shanghai Five” welcomed 
Uzbekistan as a member, and the group established Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO). By China’s insistence, combatting against “three evils” 
became the core language of SCO’s Convention. Thus, SCO became the first 
institution originally initiated by China.  
The establishment of the SCO symbolized reconsideration of Chinese 
interests in CA. The organization provides “a security guarantee, an institutional 
channel that enables China to participate in Central Asian affairs, and a general 
platform for cooperation between China and this region” (Zhao 2007, p.161). By 
taking active role in the formation of SCO, Beijing sought to show embrace for 
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multilateralism and to create an image of China as an actor that must be 
represented in institutions of regional and global importance. By adhering 
multilateral approach, Beijing hoped to accrue the reputation of actor with 
responsible behavior that would help to mitigate growing concerns of “China 
threat” (Goldstein 2005, p.119-121). At the same time, the SCO would enable 
Beijing to have its voice in Central Asian relations without opposing Russia and 
threatening states in CA (Scobel, Ratner & Beckley 2014). In sum, these foreign 
policy objectives are core elements of China’s grand strategy, which has two 
components: one is maintaining partnership with major powers, second is 
alleviating other states’ concerns about China’s growing capabilities. 
For Russia, the SCO became a regional foundation that facilitated 
Moscow’s return to Central Asian affairs (Clarke, 2010). Russia’s presence in the 
SCO enabled Moscow to keep a watchful eye and monitor Beijing’s intentions in 
the region (Swanström, 2011; 2014). Moreover, the SCO created a platform for 
China to back Moscow in Chechen campaign, while Moscow and CA could show 
their solidarity with Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang and Taiwan (Laruelle, 2008). 
Some analysts argue that despite achievements of more economic strength 
and integration into global economy during 1990s and 2000s, China does not feel 
more confident and secure. Rather such progress increases the sense of 
vulnerability and raises concerns in Beijing to protect trade routes and secure the 
access for energy deposits. China’s remarkable economic growth triggered 
disparity in wealth between its eastern and western provinces, making western 
parts more prone to internal and external threats. To overcome these issues, 
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according to analysts, China successfully employs framework of the SCO and 
pursues the so-called “Empty Fortress” strategy. This strategy refers to China’s 
efforts “to skillfully project an image of great strength and outward confidence to 
mask extreme weakness and inner insecurity” (Scobel, Ratner & Beckley 2014, 
p.48) 
The significance of SCO for CA was twofold. First, as official documents 
and statements indicate, the organization emphasizes non-interference in 
members’ domestic affairs. These features made SCO more preferable compared 
to Western institutions. Western institutions were less attractive because of their 
requirements to adhere human rights. Second, the SCO offered support to resist 
the US-hegemony in CA. Through SCO members pushed Washington to 
withdraw its military bases, that initially were welcomed in 2001 under Global 
War on Terror (GWOT) to topple Taliban regime in Afghanistan. 
The next part explains China’s achievements in building economic 
cooperation with CA. 
4.3.2. Economic cooperation. 
As Chinese engagement in CA within security issues steadily improved, so 
did its economic relations with CA. In 1999 Chinese government initiated “Great 
Western Development” (GWD) campaign and Xinjiang became the part of 
program. In addition, Beijing expected that promoting economic development in 
Xinjiang with simultaneously tightening economic cooperation with CA would 
help to avoid social destabilization in its periphery and potential political tensions 
with CA (Peyrouse 2009, p.3-7). Aforementioned campaign, as Jiang Zemin once 
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noted “presented a long-term development strategy to maintain unity of ethnic 
groups, national unification and social stability” (as cited in Fravel 2008, p.157). 
Under this program, during 2000-2005, Beijing poured more than $48 billion into 
Western provinces, including $8 billion to improve infrastructure in Xinjiang. 
Moreover, under this campaign millions of Han people migrated to Western 
peripheries (Peyrouse 2007, p.17). In contrast to the initial stages of cooperation 
when Uighurs dominated shuttle trade with neighboring countries, during the 
second phase Muslim minorities had no longer leadership in trading with CA. In 
trade relationships, Uighurs were replaced by Han people, who moved from 
Zheijang province, notably from city of Wenzhou, which is famous for export-
import activities. For instance, by early 2000s in Xinjiang, there were 80,000 
traders from Wenzhou, and almost half of them were involved in trade with CA 
(Raballand & Andrésy 2007, p.245). By balancing the role of Uighurs in trading 
with CA, Beijing wanted to prevent these relations to reinforce political and 
cultural links between Muslim minorities of Xinjiang and those of CA (Peyrouse, 
2007). 
Beijing’s “Great Western Development” campaign played crucial role in 
interconnecting economies of Xinjiang and CA. Under this program, Chinese 
central government provided Western provinces with the same preferences and 
privileges as those of coastal areas. These incentives led to the boom in trade with 
China and CA. Particularly, trade volume increased from $465 million in 1992 to 
$7,7 billion by the end of 2005, and 80 percent of total turnover was conducted 
through Xinjiang. To facilitate trade further, Xinjiang administration established 
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17 special zones and 3 free trade zones. Along borders in Xinjiang, China and its 
Central Asian neighbors established 12 border posts that facilitated trade 
activities. Moreover, under the framework of SCO, Beijing announced the 
allocation of $900 million in preferential loans for countries in CA to improve 
their infrastructures (Swanström 2007, Medeiros 2009). 
Since China’s joining World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001, 
Kyrgyzstan enjoyed trade with Xinjiang and became specialized in re-exporting 
of Chinese goods. Kyrgyz government established two regional trade centers 
(Dordoi and Karasuu), and about 75 percent of all imported Chinese goods were 
re-exported to other parts of CA (Peyrouse 2007, p.27-29). 
Trade relations between China and CA witnessed further boom. By 2011, 
trade with China reached almost $30 billion and surpassed CA’s traditional trade 
partner - Russia, whose trade turnover with CA was approximately $27 billion by 
the same year. By 2013, China-CA trade turnover accounted $50 billion (Cooley, 
2015). Although trade with CA constitutes slightly more than 1 percent of China’s 
overall trade, for China this region is nationally important as the primary source 
of Xinjiang’s development (Zhao, 2016). 
Although mutual trade witnessed significant growth, overall trade between 
China and CA is hardly diversified. For instance, in 2004 overall China-CA trade 
accounted approximately $5,9 billion, and around 75 percent of this volume 
constituted trade with Kazakhstan only (Raballand & Andrésy 2007, p.250). With 
closer examination, it becomes clear that the structure of China-CA trade is also 
not diversified. For example, 85 percent of overall Chinese exports to CA consist 
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of cheap manufacture goods, whereas 85 percent of CA exports to China is 
comprised of raw materials (Clarke, 2010). 
In general, within this period the establishment of the SCO has become a 
major shift in China’s CA policy, which initially was concentrated on border 
disputes. By actively promoting this institution, Beijing expanded and 
institutionalized its involvement in CA affairs. Within the SCO Beijing sought to 
alleviate rising concerns about its growing ambitions. Moreover, the SCO became 
an institution where China and other members backed each other in fighting 
against “three evils”. In addition to the institutional cooperation, Chinese 
government actively supported domestic investment in Xinjiang, which 
encouraged trade with CA and eventually turned China into the main trade partner 
of the region.   
4.4. Third phase (2001 to present) 
This section examines how US presence in CA since the launch of Global 
War on Terror (GWOT) altered Chinese interests in the region. Then it explains 
China’s energy policy and Beijing’s role as the provider of “public goods”. The 
section also briefly explains China’s engagement in Afghanistan, as well as 
Beijing’s latest initiative to establish a ground route that aims to link China’s 
Western periphery and Europe through CA. 
In the case of China, the presence of US bases in Uzbekistan (Khanabad K-
2 airbase) and Kyrgyzstan (Manas airbase) made Beijing feel uncomfortable, as 
Washington became “main power broker in Beijing’s strategic backyard”. Such a 
feeling was also exacerbated by the fact that US established patron-client with 
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Pakistan, which is China’s partner. In addition, Washington was seeking strategic 
partnership with Beijing’s competitor - India (Rumer 2007, p.45). Washington’s 
role as new security manager in CA marginalized growing ambitions of Beijing in 
this region and the impact of US-led war on terror triggered Beijing’s perceptions 
that Washington was seeking a strategy of “encirclement” of China (Rumer 2007; 
Clarke 2010). These perceptions interconnected with Beijing’s goal to integrate 
Xinjiang through economic and infrastructural links with Eurasian continent as 
the component of “peaceful rise” strategy. In Beijing, there was a fear in strategic 
realm too. If tensions between Beijing and Washington over Taiwan dramatically 
increase simultaneously with major problem in CA, in the worst case China would 
find itself in two fronts (Zhao, 2007). 
4.4.1. Security cooperation. 
To the decision to establish US military bases in CA, Beijing’s official 
reaction was uncertain. There were three reasons why Beijing stayed silent to this 
question. First reason is that Chinese policy about the presence of US in CA is not 
clear. For China it became difficult to formulate its vision on Washington’s 
precise role in CA, especially towards China itself (Zhao, 2007). Second reason 
lies in the difficulty to formulate a common China-CA approach towards US role 
in the region. While CA wants to benefit from closer relations with Washington in 
terms of receiving economic and military assistance, as well as ensuring regional 
and domestic security, it is not in Beijing’s interests to have US troops in China’s 
rear. Therefore, it became complicated for Beijing to formulate a policy on the 
role of US considering its own interests and those of CA simultaneously (Zhao, 
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2007). Third factor is in the contradictory nature of interests of both China and the 
US. They seem to share common interests in non-traditional security that is 
cooperating and fighting against global terrorism, as well as in CA. In this sense 
military presence of the US in CA might be reasonable (Zhao, 2007). On the other 
hand, such a presence contradicts with Chinese long-term interests and it triggers 
concerns of Beijing in terms of traditional security. In case of intensification of 
issue over Taiwan, Chinese feared that Washington’s military presence in CA 
could become permanent and would certainly deter Beijing. In addition, there 
were concerns, that US could use its presence to destabilize Xinjiang and cut off 
Beijing’s energy supplies from CA (Cooley, 2012). 
Yet, China received undeniable benefits from US-led anti-terror campaign 
in CA. The campaign provided Beijing with opportunity to expand security 
operations against separatists in Xinjiang and Beijing employed norms of GWOT 
to frame its own campaign in Xinjiang. According to the report published by 
Chinese government in 2002, Beijing blamed Al-Qaeda in supporting Uighur 
separatists in anti-state activities and claimed that ETM was responsible for over 
200 terrorist incidents in Xinjiang, killing 162 people of all ethnic groups 
(Dwivedi 2006, p.143). In 2002 Washington supported Beijing in the UN to list 
ETM as an international terrorist organization and Uighur separatism, which was 
China’s domestic issue, thus became priority of GWOT (Cooley, 2012). 
4.4.2. China’s engagement in Afghanistan. 
Meantime, Beijing’s contributions to anti-Taliban campaign in Afghanistan 
were limited. For instance, Beijing rejected Washington’s 2009 proposal to 
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establish supplementary logistic route to Southern Distribution Network that 
would transit non-lethal military supplies to Afghanistan through China’s 
Xinjiang and connect it to Northern Distribution Network. In addition, it was in 
China’s interest to limit its engagement in campaign, otherwise for Afghan and 
other leaders Beijing would appear as plotting with the US in the occupation of 
Afghanistan (Scobel, Ratner & Beckley, 2014). In addition, in Beijing there was a 
conviction that by participating in US-led campaign would turn China into a 
greater target for extremists (Zimmerman, 2015). Instead, China preferred 
bilateral relations with government in Kabul in terms of investment. In words of 
Chinese foreign minister, China believes that “the peace and stability of 
Afghanistan has an impact on the security of western China, and more 
importantly, it affects the tranquility and development of the entire region” (as 
cited in Zimmerman 2015, p.13-14). For example, as of 2008, China invested $3 
billion in copper mines in Afghanistan’s Logar province and there were 33 
Beijing-sponsored infrastructure projects with total value of $480 million 
(Swanström 2011, p.44). Moreover, Beijing has been active in working with post-
Taliban government. Upon the request of Afghan government, China has been 
assertive to use its influence over Pakistan to bring Taliban to the negotiations and 
facilitated trilateral dialogues of US, Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 2014, Beijing 
pledged to provide Kabul with assistance of $327 million, as well as investment 
and training of 3,000 Afghan officials for coming five years (Zimmerman, 2015).  
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4.4.3. Impacts of “color revolutions”. 
Series “color revolutions” in Eurasian continent (Georgia, Ukraine, 
Kyrgyzstan) brought new geopolitical changes into region. The “tulip revolution” 
in Kyrgyzstan (March 2005) and Andijan rebellion in Uzbekistan (May 2005) 
broke US-CA relations. Local governments claimed that Western states under 
rhetoric of promoting democracy, were supporting anti-government and illegal 
forces to overthrow secular regimes in CA. Chinese argued that the presence of 
US forces and NGOs could be used to move those revolutions into China’s 
Muslim-populated Xinjiang (Medeiros, 2009). Washington’s desire to advance 
democracy and regime changes in CA turned into powerful shocks and had 
opposite effects (Rumer, 2007). As Walt simply put it “if the effort to penetrate is 
viewed by the target state as subversive or illegitimate, it is likely to react by 
moving away from the state seeking to enhance its influence and the penetration 
will therefore be counterproductive (Walt 1985, p.31). 
Both Russia and China had fears that anti-government movements would 
spread into their territories and they supported Uzbek government to fight against 
“three evils” and suppress the riot in Andijan. Dramatic changes in US-CA 
relationships came to favor of both Beijing and Moscow, as they were seeking to 
counter Washington’s excessive influence in CA. In the SCO’s 2005 Astana 
summit, member states made joint statement and called Washington to set a 
timetable to withdraw its military bases from CA. It was an indication that Russia 
and China have considerable voices against US hegemony, while local countries 
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demonstrated that they appreciate Beijing and Moscow (Rumer, 2007). American 
troops vacated bases in Uzbekistan in November 2005 and in Kyrgyzstan in 2013. 
4.4.4. Energy policy. 
This section explains China’s energy diplomacy in CA. 
Two basic issues define China’s energy security: volatilities in energy prices 
and security of stable energy supplies. China is insecure in both aspects and these 
feelings are shaping its overall diplomacy (Medeiros, 2009). Rich energy deposits 
of CA and access to these resources have been another priority for Beijing’s 
strategy in the region. In 2008, China imported about 45 percent of its crude from 
Middle East and 22 percent from Africa (Medeiros, 2009). These regions are 
considered as politically unstable, while transportation routes are long-distance 
and subject for accidental and deliberate risks, and therefore it is important for 
Beijing to prevent disruptions by diversifying its supplies. Geographical 
proximity and current oil and gas reserves of CA, which make 8 percent and 4.3 
percent of world reserves respectively, offer Beijing stable and secure supplies 
(Cabestan, 2011). By having access to hydrocarbons of CA through direct ground 
pipelines, Beijing also wants to reduce its dependence on sea routes, for instance 
Malacca Straits, through which China transports almost 60 percent of its oil 
supplies (Peyrouse, 2007). Construction of land-based oil and gas pipelines from 
CA would reduce China’s dependence on international tanker companies, which 
ship 90 percent of China’s oil supplies (Medeiros, 2009). All these factors explain 
CA’s strategic importance for Chinese energy security. 
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Beijing’s engagement in hydrocarbons of CA began with the purchase of 
Kazakh Aktyubinsk Oil and Gas Company by Chinese National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) in 1997. Next major purchase occurred in 2005, when CNPC 
fully purchased a second major oil company in the region - PetroKazakh, by 
investing $4,18 billion. This investment is China’s largest overseas energy 
investment (Zhao 2007, p.166-168). This purchase assured Chinese control over 
12 percent of Kazakhstan’s total oil production (Cooley 2012, p.91). 
Currently two major pipelines deliver oil and gas from CA to China. One of 
them is China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline. With the total cost of $700 million and 
length about 3,000 kilometers (about 2,818 kilometers run in Kazakhstan and 
about 270 kilometers in China), pipeline came to full operation in 2011 and 
mainly ships Kazakhstan’s Caspian oil to Xinjiang. At the same time, this pipeline 
links Kazakhstan’s another continental oil fields that are purchased and exploited 
by Chinese oil companies. The pipeline with the current capacity ships 20 million 
tons of oil annually, however its potential could be doubled by 40 million tons per 
year, which may secure about 8-10 percent of China’s total oil imports (Laruelle 
& Peyrouse 2009, p.45). According to the latest estimates, China’s stake in 
Kazakhstan’s total oil production reached 21 percent and surpassed by 2.5 times 
that of Russia, which has been considered as traditional owner of oil fields in 
Kazakhstan (Kim & Blank, 2013). In 2013 Kazakhstan supplied 11.98 million 
tons of oil or 4.2 percent of 282,1 million tons China’s total oil imports that year 
(Zhao 2016, p.179). 
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Second major source of China’s energy supply is China-Central Asia gas 
pipeline, which was completed in 2012. With total cost of $7,31 billion, this 
pipeline connects three countries – Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
(lines A, B and C respectively) and finally joins into China’s West-East pipeline 
network. This pipeline has been successful for China, as Beijing convinced these 
states to sell gas jointly, without constructing separate lines from each country 
(Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2009). The line with 180 kilometers length starts in 
Turkmenistan, then follows Uzbekistan’s 500 kilometer part which links to 
Kazakhstan’s line of 1,300 kilometers length. By the end of 2015, the pipeline 
was expected to deliver 55 bcm of gas or 20 percent of China’s annual gas 
consumption. An additional “D” part is under construction. It will transit 
additional 30 bcm gas to China through Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
simultaneously providing the latter with Turkmen gas. Such arrangement makes 
CNPC both regional distributor and exporter of Central Asian gas (Cooley 2015, 
p.2-3). Currently Turkmenistan is China’s largest gas exporter and supplies 46 
percent of total Chinese gas imports (Zhao 2016, p.179). Beijing’s aggressive 
entry into energy market of CA effectively broke the Russian monopoly over 
transportation and offered additional market for local countries to diversify their 
energy exports. 
As argument goes, economic diplomacy is one of the Chinese statecraft 
tools, which fosters China’s diplomatic goals by using trade, investment and 
notable financial instruments (Medeiros, 2009). Among the latter there are some 
dimensions such as outward direct investment and foreign aid. In this sense 
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Beijing has effectively positioned itself as source of investment (mostly in energy 
sector and infrastructure) and financial aid for CA. For Kazakhstan, China has 
become fourth largest lender after the Netherlands, the US and the UK. Chinese 
investment in Kazakh economy increased from $4 billion in 2008 to $7,9 billion 
in 2009, and the figure is expected to reach $20 billion in few years (Kim & 
Blank, 2013). Beijing was active in providing financial aid too. In 2009 China’s 
Export-Import Bank lent Kazakh state-owned Development Bank $5 billion. The 
same year, Kazakh state gas company Kazmunaigas received a $5-billion loan 
from CNPC (Kim & Blank 2013, p.783). During 2008-2009 financial crisis due to 
the financial shortages Turkmenistan faced financial problems to construct its part 
of the pipeline. Beijing was quick to provide financial resources and 
Turkmenistan received two emergency loans from China’s Export-Import Bank 
with the total amount of $8 billion (Cooley 2015, p.3). Currently China is the 
biggest creditor of Tajikistan. As of 2015 Beijing’s share in aid-dependent 
Tajikistan’s external debt constituted 43 percent ($ 0,9. billion). Moreover, in 
2014 China pledged to allocate a $6-billion investment during next three years, 
the number which equals to two-thirds of Tajikistan’s annual GDP and 40 times 
more than annual inflow of foreign direct investment into the country’s economy. 
Moreover, $ 1,2 billion or 35 percent of Kyrgyzstan's external debt also belongs to 
China (Farchy, 2015). By the end of 2015, Chinese loans in Central Asian 
economies totaled $30 billion; Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are the biggest 
receivers, with the share of 43 and 40 percent, respectively (Mordvinova, 2016). 
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4.4.5. Silk Road initiative. 
Another importance of CA for Beijing is that the region offers a 
supplementary trade route Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) that is component of 
China’s grand initiative One Road One Belt (OBOR). During his visit to 
Kazakhstan in September 2013, president Xi introduced SREB for the first time. 
The route will link China’s Western peripheries through CA, West Asia and 
Middle East to Europe. The project comprises railway networks within the 
continent. Another component of OBOR is 21st century Maritime Silk Road 
(MSR), which was announced by Chinese president in October 2013. The project 
is designed to boost investment and collaboration between China, ASEAN 
countries, Oceania and North Africa through maritime route in Indian Ocean, 
South Pacific Ocean and South China Sea. To realize the OBOR strategy Beijing 
launched institutions that will finance these projects. $40 billion Silk Road Fund 
and $100 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are major providers 
of funds for building infrastructures along with SREB and MSR routes. In 
addition to financial resources, Beijing announced the establishment of think-tank 
to study OBOR initiative. The institution, which is co-funded by China 
Development Bank, Tsinghua University and the Silk Road Fund, will take a role 
in strategic research and preparing suggestions for policy-making. 
With the announcement of the SREB, analysts expected that Beijing’s 
initiative would undermine Moscow-led EEU, which is projected to foster 
integration in CA (Blank, 2015). They also predicted that both Beijing and 
Moscow would oppose each other and find themselves in strict tensions in CA. 
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Scholars argued that Moscow’s EEU is much more politically oriented and 
designed to create political and economic association with Moscow in center. 
EEU would serve Kremlin’s aim to create “Eurasian pole” as the balance against 
Western hegemony in a multipolar world (Mankoff, 2015). Yet, China’s SREB 
focuses on creating trade and transit routes which would facilitate Chinese exports 
to Middle East and European markets. In contrast, Beijing’s idea is designed to 
link CA with global economy and not to isolate it around China’s orbit only 
(Mankoff, 2015). Beijing itself had a concern that Moscow, uneasy about its own 
diminishing status in CA, would consider Beijing’s intentions as encroachment 
into Moscow’s spheres of influence and therefore would push CA states to reject 
SREB (Gabuev, 2015). 
Yet, there were some skeptical views about success of SREB initiative. 
Although these views do not doubt its significance for CA given region’s needs 
for vast investment, they argued about two main obstacles for the project. The 
first is that Russia’s participation in Chinese initiative would demand Moscow to 
resign itself as “junior brother” vis-à-vis Beijing that seemed not acceptable for 
Moscow (Blank, 2015). However, it seems that such a factor is no longer justified. 
Moscow was able to convince Beijing not to advance its project relying on 
bilateral relations with CA, which would undermine Moscow’s stand in the 
region. Instead, Kremlin proposed its own project as a ground for cooperation, 
which would ensure Kremlin’s voice in Chinese initiatives in CA. Another reason 
is the lack of integrity among Han people and Muslim minorities in China itself. 
Any destabilization in Xinjiang that is considered as “Eurasian Continental 
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Bridge”, not only undermines the project, but also might destabilize CA itself 
(Blank, 2015). However, Beijing was surprised, as Russia did not regard the 
initiative as a threat, rather acknowledged it as an opportunity to foster integration 
with EEU. During Xi’s visit to Moscow in May 2015, Chinese and Russian 
leaders announced about cooperation between SREB and EEU; they also claimed 
that Russia and China would collaborate in creating “Eurasian common economic 
space”. In short, it appears that both China and Russia need stable and peaceful 
CA, therefore they are seeking to reach a “labor division” in this region. Moscow, 
with its closer relationships with CA in security and military spheres, seems to 
remain hard security guarantor. On the other side, China with its abundant 
financial resources and stronger economic tights with CA will hold the role of 
main driver for economic development in the region. 
4.5. Conclusion 
China was not among the participants of old “Great Game” in CA during 
19th century. Now China is one of the key partners of CA. China’s engagement in 
the region has shifted several phases. China was able to resolve all border issues 
with post-soviet states after the collapse of Soviet Union. China received 
assurances of cooperation in securing its Muslim-populated Xinjiang province, 
combatting against “three evils” and establishing a multilateral institution. China 
has become major player in Central Asian market of hydrocarbons. In addition, 
China is the largest trade partner of Central Asia. Chinese government has 
effectively linked economies of Western peripheries with Eurasian continent. 
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In regards to the SREB, the latest Chinese initiative, which includes CA, 
several objectives of the project have links to China’s grand strategy. First is 
economic components and possibility of removing excessive industrial capacities 
to the neighboring regions. This would bring more opportunities of development 
for neighbors thereby assuring these countries that China’s growth is opportunity, 
rather than threat. Second explanation is Beijing’s aim to reduce its reliance on 
maritime trade routes. Washington’s “rebalance” strategy towards Asia made 
Chinese policy-makers worry about Washington’s ambitions to contain China's 
growing. In the case of conflict in the South China Sea, China will need 
alternative ground routes to maintain its trade relations. Currently, China conducts 
trade with Europe (its largest trade partner) through a 26,000-kilometer sea route, 
which takes about 45 days. Alternative route through CA would decrease distance 
to 6,379 kilometers and delivery time to 11 days, saving approximately 30 percent 
of transportation cost (Swaström 2014, p.8). Finally, third objective is diplomatic. 
The project implies to Chinese soft power through investment to improve 
infrastructures and commerce along with the route. Through this opportunity, 
Beijing seeks to alleviate growing concerns about Chinese ambitions. This is 
especially important for CA, contiguous to the restless Xinjiang. It is in China’s 
interest that better multilateral relationships would secure its own borders and will 
ensure success of its ongoing domestic reforms. Beijing’s diplomacy in CA 
primarily rests on economic cooperation, as it seeks stability through economic 
development and gain access to critical energy resources. Economic diplomacy of 
China would rather contribute an international image of Beijing as a benign 
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neighbor, who focuses merely on providing security and stability in CA. As 
discussed in the theoretical part, a state designs grand strategy to develop its long-
term objectives by using its military and non-military capabilities. Ultimately, 
grand strategy ensures the realization of state’s national interest given both 
domestic and international constraints. China, a potential major power, faces 
opposition from some actors, who perceive China’s growth as a threat to their 
security. At the same time, China engages with other major powers and 
demonstrates that China is essential participant of multipolar international system. 
The study of China’s grand strategy demonstrates that China advances its interests 
in CA region without deteriorating its relations with Russia, a former hegemon in 
CA, who has its own ambitions in this region. Meantime, China has already 
turned into a public goods provider for some countries in CA, thereby promoting 




This research has explained Central Asian policy of two countries - Russia 
and China, through national identity and grand strategy approaches. 
In case of Russia, the paper found that the main driving force of Russia’s 
foreign policy in CA is Russian national identity. There are three traditions of 
Russian foreign policy, and each of them has presented Russia’s national identity 
in distinct ways. The identity of Europeanness considers Russia as the part of 
Western community and wants Russia to integrate with Western values. The 
identity of Eurasianism views Russia foremost as great power in Eurasian 
continent, and strives for Western recognition in terms of power balance in 
Eurasia. Finally, Slavic identity considers Western community as hostile to 
Russian interests and wants Russia to create union with Belarus and Ukraine on 
the basis of Slavic values. At times when Russia finds its co-operative stance 
ignored by Western community, such tendency results perception of hostility, 
which leads Russia to aggressive semi-isolation stance towards the West. In such 
case, the feeling of “great powerness” which is central idea of Russia’s 
Eurasianism identity shapes Russia’s foreign policy. In this context, CA provides 
Russia with the space where it can satisfy the need to restore its “great 
powerness” and to realize the capability of power projection. By doing so Russia 
shows the status of great power, which in Russia’s view should be recognized by 
Western community and ultimately wishes to shape international order equally 
with Western powers. 
Perception of Russian identity – Slavic, European, Eurasian - have been 
central question to the debate about Russia’s role in post-Cold War period, 
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whether it should rebuild itself as a “modern” power or continue to emphasize its 
traditional advantage of military power and improve its international influence. 
Such multiplicity of views explains failures in foreign policy during the first post-
Soviet decade. Such issues had especially strong impacts on balance between 
policy in post-Soviet space and the priority of integration with the Western 
community. During the whole post-Soviet period Russian policy towards Central 
Asia has been paradoxical. Yeltsin’s Russia sought to distance itself from CA 
(observed in early 1990s). Once Moscow realized failures of Westernism foreign 
policy, Russia decided to regain its lost influence by promoting active integration 
process with post-Soviet states, including CA (as observed during late 1990s). 
This process, however, was overly concentrated on security issues and became too 
costly for Russia, which already was in deep economic crisis. By early 2000s as 
Putin assumed power in Russia, its foreign policy in CA became more coherent 
and attained pragmatic approach. In CA Putin’s foreign policy was successful in 
terms of establishing common economic and common security spaces, which 
enables Moscow to reassert its regional primacy and more importantly, to fulfil 
the sense of “great powerness”.  
Moscow’s bilateral relations with Washington have affected Russian foreign 
policy in CA too. Russia’s efforts to transcend its influence and leverage in CA to 
closer cooperation with Western community had short-time success. This success 
allowed Moscow to have a common agenda to fight against global terror. 
However, when Moscow realized that its role had not met assumed recognition as 
Washington started dealing with regional states ignoring Moscow’s mediation, 
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Russia tried to compensate these losses by showing capabilities of power 
projection in CA. Such reaction from the West came as challenge to Russian 
Self. Deterioration of relations with the US after “color revolutions” had impacts 
on Moscow’s perception that relations in CA were geopolitically intensified. 
Yet, it is not to say that Russia’s foreign policy in CA is driven only by its 
identity and free of other interests. Security, economic and energy interests also 
drive Moscow’s policy in the region. Security concerns implies Russia to prevent 
the spread of religious radicalism to its Muslim populated regions. In the sphere 
of energy, Russia wants to prevent the construction of pipelines that would bypass 
Russian territory and eventually link region’s hydrocarbons to European 
continent. In Moscow’s view, this would undermine its role in the region as well 
as its relative role as hegemon gas supplier to Europe. In terms of economic 
interests, it seems that Russia accepts its weaker position compared to China, and 
relies mostly on its “hard power” rather than economic capabilities. After 2000s, 
Russia was able to regain its hitherto lost influence in the region and established 
its own institutions like CSTO and EEU. Both institutions give Moscow an 
opportunity to present itself as a Eurasian major power that improves its self-
esteem feeling and its stance in the eyes of international community. If Russia 
wants its foreign policy in CA to be effective, Moscow should avoid to block 
regional countries’ relations within Moscow-led projects like CSTO or EEU. Such 
“limited” relationships are likely to bring opposite results – they will push local 
states to search ways to distance themselves from Russia, which in turn may bring 
tensions between Russia and the region. On the other side, such tensions will 
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trigger Russia’s aggressive feelings towards other major actors in CA. If Russia 
deals with CA as the region under hegemony or showcase of its “great 
powerness” and desire to receive Western recognition for such status, its foreign 
policy towards CA is likely to prove inefficient and counter-productive because 
such policy will damage Russian prestige and credibility. Although Russia is 
major outside power for the region, Moscow needs to accept that CA is no longer 
under monopoly of Russian “great powerness”. Instead, Moscow needs to offer 
more options to cooperate with both local states and other actors, who already 
have gained influence in Central Asia. In other words, Moscow should treat the 
region not as the zone of “exclusive influence”, but rather “sphere of interests”. In 
short, Russian foreign policy in CA should not be shadowed by nostalgia of 
“imperialism”. 
The research also found that driving factor of China’s Central Asian 
diplomacy is its grand strategy. The findings showed that China’s grand strategy 
is designed to ensure its peaceful rise and prevent other states from opposing 
China, thereby asserting that China’s rise is opportunity for other states, rather 
that threat. In terms of “ends” China’s grand strategy has three main strategic 
objectives such as sovereignty and territorial integrity, promotion of economic 
and military modernization and maximizing or at least maintaining status of great 
power. Chinese diplomacy manages external relations of China through three 
main ranks like great powers, neighboring countries and developing countries. CA 
falls under the category of “peripheral strategy”. In terms of ends, the importance 
of CA for China’s strategy can be summarized as follows. First, CA is significant 
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for maintaining domestic security and economic development of Xinjiang. The 
more incentives for economic cooperation between China’s Muslim populated 
provinces and CA, the more chances for China to maintain peace in its Western 
peripheries. Second, CA is strategically important to advance SREB, which is to 
stimulate trade between China’s relatively less developed Western periphery and 
Europe through CA, thereby fostering development of peripheral provinces. 
Stability in CA is of strategic importance for China; the more stable CA the more 
chances for China to concentrate on other primary concerns. At the same time, for 
China, CA is important source of energy resources and relatively safe route that 
reduces Beijing’s dependence other energy-rich regions, which are distant and 
unstable due to geopolitical risks. 
Since the collapse of Soviet Union China has developed its policy in the 
region steadily. In the initial stages of relationships with the region, China 
initiated negotiations over border and territorial issues with Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The analysis showed that in territorial and border 
disputes settlement China’s stance was cooperative and in most cases Beijing 
offered considerable concessions to its Central Asian neighbors. Another issue 
that altered China’s policy towards CA in initial stage was Uighur separatism in 
Xinjiang. This problem has been central concern for China’s territorial integrity 
since the last century. By offering concessions in territorial disputes, Chinese 
government sought to receive assurances from Central Asian countries in mutual 
cooperation against separatist movements. After the settlement of border 
problems, China and its Central Asian neighbors along with Russia established 
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“Shanghai Five” group, which facilitated further measures for cooperation. By the 
end of 1990s, members of “Shanghai Five” faced growing threats of religious 
extremism, which was emanating from Afghanistan under Taliban regime. In 
2001 with the leadership of China, “Shanghai Five” members and Uzbekistan 
reformed the group into Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Thanks to the 
leadership of Chinese government, combatting against “three evils” became 
central agenda of SCO. To some extent, the organization became a showcase of 
China’s adherence to multilateralism, which would present China as responsible 
actor both in international and regional politics. Another importance of SCO is 
that it provides a side benefits in calming regional fears about China’s growing 
capabilities and enables China to advance its diplomacy without altering 
Moscow’s role in this region. In sum, within last two decades the establishment of 
the SCO has institutionalized China’s engagement in political and economic 
relations of CA. Security and stability both in Xinjiang and Central Asia is likely 
to remain core objective of SCO for coming years. 
At the same time, the economic backwardness of Xinjiang is another issue 
that drives China’s policy towards Central Asia. Chinese government’s initiatives 
to launch of economic development programs in Western peripheries, has 
effectively turned China, notable Xinjiang, to the major trade partner of CA. By 
promoting domestic programs in Xinjiang, China sought to facilitate trade with 
Muslim minorities of Xinjiang and Central Asia, thereby alleviating discontent 
within minorities with simultaneously connecting economies of Western 
peripheries with Central Asian markets. Although trade turnover between China 
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and CA has increased significantly, the pattern of trade is hardly diversified. The 
long-term objective is to transform Xinjiang into “Eurasian Continental Bridge”, 
which is expected to link China’s Western peripheries with Middle East and 
Europe Europe through CA under Silk Road Economic Belt. 
Energy deposits of CA and access to them has been another objective for 
China’s CA strategy. Within last decade China was able construct two main 
pipelines, which deliver gas and oil from CA to China’s Xinjiang province. The 
policy of energy diversification and growing energy demands brought China into 
enter energy market of CA. Since late 2000s, China was able to purchase two 
major Kazakh oil companies with the biggest shares in oil production of 
Kazakhstan. These deals have provided China with direct access to Kazakhstan’s 
Caspian oil reserves and now China is one of the biggest owners of oil fields in 
Kazakhstan. Furthermore, China has constructed China-Central Asia gas pipeline, 
which gave access to energy of gas-rich countries (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan). 
Although the establishment of the U.S. military bases in CA caused laments 
from Beijing, US-led GWOT was beneficial for China. By the help of the US and 
under the rhetoric of combating global terror, China could frame its domestic 
policy against rebellions as fight against religious extremism and terrorism. 
Moreover, China was able to reach accord in the United Nations to list ETM as 
international terrorist organization. Yet, Beijing’s contribution to GWOT was 
limited. It was due to the perceptions that active participation in GWOT would 
cause China more extremist threats. 
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In terms of realizing foreign policy objectives, Beijing has mostly relied on 
powerful economic diplomacy. By providing financial aid and cheap loans, now 
China has become major provider of “public goods” in CA. Chinese loans gained 
considerable shares in the construction of Central Asian infrastructure projects. 
In sum, what has enabled China to gain its voice in Central Asia is its grand 
strategy, and what moves Russian desire to regain its influence in this region is 
Russian national identity. In doing so, it appears that Beijing and Moscow have 
consensus over “labor division” in Central Asian relations – Russia assumes 
military supremacy, while China holds upper hand in economic influence. 
Although the thesis has analyzed Russian and Chinese foreign policy in CA 
through two different perspectives (national identity and grand strategy), the part 
of conclusion that the two sides have reached “labor division” in realizing their 
interests in CA leads us to the implication that in a single neighboring region two 
major powers may act in “harmony”, rather than “zero-sum” competition. The 
two states have mutual objective, which is to promote multipolar international 
system. Meantime, they have different ways to realize their objectives. Russia, for 
instance, wants to regain (at times, aggressively) its previous prestige and wants 
to be treated as a “great power”; while China’s growing capabilities (military and 
non-military) are to ensure its “peaceful rise” to great power status. It seems, that 
Moscow and Beijing understand that their different roles in CA are 
complementary and mutually beneficial for each side. China benefits from 
Russia’s upper role in maintaining regional security in CA. Such role secures 
Chinese projects in CA and to some extent, prevents the spread of radical Islam to 
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Xinjiang through CA. Nevertheless, China’s economic leadership (trade, 
investment, financial aid) also brings peace and stability to CA – Russia’s 
“backyard”, and serves Russian interests, too. Meantime, such “labor division” 
between Moscow and Beijing has advantages for Central Asian states. Such a 
division might imply to the theory of hegemonic stability and hypothesis that a 
single region might be under two hegemons at the same time. If Russia and China 
successfully link and further develop their projects (EEU and SREB) by 
simultaneously maintaining their relative roles in Central Asian affairs, the 
implication that two major powers may act in “harmony” type of interaction is a 
topic that needs to be addressed in further studies. 
  
	 115 
List of References 
Blank, S. (2010). The Influence of External Actors in Central Asia. In E.Kavalski (eds.), 
The New Central Asia: The Regional Impact of International Actors, pp.281-302. 
Sydney: World Scientific Publishing. 
Blank, S. (2013). The Influence of China and Russia in Central Asia: Ongoing Rivalry 
and Shifting Strategies. The National Bureau and Asian Research. Retrieved from 
http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=329  
Blank, S. (2015). China’s Silk Roads and Their Challenges. The Central Asia-Caucasus 
Analyst. Retrieved from http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-
articles/item/13119-chinas-silk-roads-and-their-challenges.html 
Bogaturov, A. (2006) Russia’s Strategic Thought toward Asia: The Early Yeltsin’s Years 
(1991-95). In G.Rozman, K.Togo, J.Ferguson (eds.), Russian Strategic Thought 
toward Asia, (pp. 57-73). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Cabestan, J. (2010). China’s New Diplomacy: old wine in a new bottle? In Sh.Breslin 
(eds.), Handbook of China’s International Relations (1st ed.). (pp. 1-10). London, 
UK: Routledge. 
Cabestan, J. (2011).  Energy Cooperation between China and Central Asia. China 
Analysis, European Council on Foreign Relations (pp.6-8). 
Clarke, M. (2010a). China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: The Dynamics of 
“New Regionalism,” “Vassalization,” and Geopolitics in Central Asia. In 
E.Kavalski (eds.), The New Central Asia: The Regional Impact of International 
Actors, (pp.117-146). Sydney: World Scientific Publishing. 
Clarke, M. (2010b). China’s Deepening Ties with Central Asia. Bloomberg. Retrieved 
from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-05-26/chinas-deepening-ties-
with-central-asia 
Cohen, A. (2013). How the US Withdrawal from Afghanistan Will Affect Russia and 
Eurasia. In S.Blank (eds.), Central Asia after 2014 (pp. 13-30), Strategic Studies 
Institute. Retrieved from 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1175.pdf  
Cooley, A. (2012). Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central 
Asia. New York: Oxford University. 
Cooley, A. (2015). China’s Changing Role in Central Asia and Implications for US 
Policy: From Trading Partner to Collective Goods Provider. Remarks presented 
for “Looking West: China and Central Asia” U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission.. Retrieved from 
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Cooley%20Testimony_3.18.15.pdf  
Dittmer, L. (2007). Central Asia and the Regional Powers. China and Eurasia Forum 
Quarterly, Volume 5, No. 4. pp. 7-22.  
Dwivedi, R. (2006). China’s Central Asia Policy in Recent Times. China and Eurasia 
Forum Quarterly, Volume 4, No. 4, pp. 39-59.  
Eivazov, D. (2010). Kitay v Tsentralnoy Azii: Interesy bezopsnosti i geopoliticheskaya 
aktivnost [China in Central Asia: Security Interests and Geopolitical Activity]. 
Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 8-22. 
	 116 
Enval, J. (2014). Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: Next in Line. In F.Starr & S.Cornell (eds.). 
Putin’s Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and its Discontents (pp. 110-121). 




Farchy, J. (2015). China’s Great Game: In Russia’s Backyard. Financial Times. 
Retrieved from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d35d34ca-6e70-11e5-aca9-
d87542bf8673.html#axzz49v6edqBv 
Feaver, P. (2009). What is grand strategy and why do we need it? Foreign Policy. 
Retreived from http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/04/08/what-is-grand-strategy-and-
why-do-we-need-it/ 
Ferguson, J. (2006). Russian Strategic Thinking toward Central, South and Southeast 
Asia. In G.Rozman, K.Togo, J.Ferguson (eds.), Russian Strategic Thought toward 
Asia, (pp. 205-223). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Finklestein, D. (2009). Commentary on China’s External Grand Strategy. Brookings 
Institution, Conference paper. Retrieved from 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2009/7/14-
china/20090714_china_finkelstein.pdf  
Fravel, T. (2008). Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s 
Territorial Disputes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Gabuev, A. (2015). China’s Silk Road Challenge. Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace. Retrieved from 
http://carnegieendowment.org/commentary/2015/11/12/china-s-silk-road-
challenge/im66 
Gilpin, R. (2001). Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic 
Order. Princeton University. 
Goldstein, A. (2003). An Emerging China’s Emerging Strategy: A Neo-Bismarckian 
Turn? In J.Ikenberry & M.Mastanduno (eds.), International Relations Theory and 
the Asia-Pacific. (pp. 57-87). New York: Columbia University.  
Goldstein, A. (2005). Rising to Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International 
Security. Stanford, California: Stanford University. 
Griffiths, M., & O’Callaghan T. (2008). International Relations: The Key Concepts, (2nd 
ed.) London and New York: Routledge. 
Harris, S. (2014). China’s Foreign Policy. Willey. 
Heilman, S,. & Schmidt, D. (2014). China’s Foreign Political and Economic Relations: 
An Unconditional Global Power. Rowman & Littlefield. 
Hopf, T. (2002). Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign 
Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999. Cornell University Press. 
Joshua, K. (2012). Central Asia: What is China’s Policy Driver? Eurasianet. Retrieved 
from http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66314 
Kennedy, P. (1991). Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition. In 
P.Kennedy Grand Strategies in War and Peace, (ed.), New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
	 117 
Keohane, R., Martin, L. (1995). The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. International 
Security, Vol. 20, No.1. pp. 39-51. 
Kim, Y., Blank, S. (2013). Same Bed, Different Dreams: China’s ‘peaceful rise’ and 
Sino-Russian rivalry in Central Asia. Journal of Contemporary China, 2013 Vol. 
22, No. 83, pp. 773–790, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2013.782126  
Kim, Y., Indeo, F. (2013). The new great game in Central Asia post 2014: The US “New 
Silk Road” strategy and Sino-Russian rivalry. Communist and Post-Communist 
studies, 46 (2013). Pp.275-286. 
Kupchan, C., Ikenberry, G. (1990). Socialization and Hegemonic Power. International 
Organization, Vol. 44, No. 3. Pp.283-315. 
Lanteigne, M. (2010). Security, strategy and the former USSR: China and the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization. In Sh.Breslin (eds.), Handbook of China’s International 
Relations (1st ed.). (pp. 166-175). London, UK: Routledge. 
Laruelle, M. (2010). Russia and Central Asia. In E.Kavalski (eds.), The New Central 
Asia: The Regional Impact of International Actors, (pp.149-174). Sydney: World 
Scientific Publishing. 
Laruelle, M., Peyrouse, S. (2009). China as a Neighbor: Central Asian Perspectives and 
Strategies. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Program. Retreived from 
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/Monographs/2009_BOOK_Laruelle-
Peyrouse_China-Central-Asia.pdf  
Linn, F. (2012). Central Asian Regional Integration and Cooperation: Reality or Mirage? 
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2012. Retreived from 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/10/regional-integration-
cooperation-linn  
Lo, B. (2002). Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Lo, B. (2003). Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy. London: The 
Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
Lo, B. (2015). Frontiers New and Old: Russia’s Policy in Central Asia. Russia/NIS 
center. Retrieved from 
https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifri_rnv_82_central_asia_bobolo
_eng_january_2015_0.pdf 
Lynn-Jones, M. (1998). “Realism and America’s Rise: A Review Essay,” International 
Security 23 (2): 157–182.  
Mankoff, J. (2009). Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics. Blue 
Ridge Summit, PA, USA: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Mankoff, J. (2015). Strani Tsentralnoy Azii vibirayut bolee ostorojnuyu politiku 
[Countries of Central Asia are choosing cautious politics], Central Asian Analytical 
Network (CAAN). Retrieved from http://caa-network.org/archives/4498  
Mariani, B. (2013). China’s Role and Interest in Central Asia. SAFERWORLD. Briefing 
paper. Retrieved from http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=172938  
Martel, W. (2015). Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective 
American Foreign Policy. NY: Cambridge University Press. 
	 118 
Mearsheimer, J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. 
Medeiros, E. (2009). China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism and, 
Diversification. RAND Corporation. Retrieved from 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf 
Mikkelsen, B. (2005). Methods for Development Work and Research: A new guide for 
practitioners, (2nd edition). New Delhi: SAGE. 
Moravcsik, A. (1997).  Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Politics. International Organization Vol. 51, No. 4. pp.513–553. 
Mordvinova, A. (2016). Ekonomicheskaya strategiya Kitaya v Tsentralnoy Azii: Zadachi, 
instrumenti, rezultati. [China’s economic strategy in Central Asia: Objectives, 
Instruments, Outcomes]. Ural-Eurasia. Retrieved from http://ural-
eurasia.ru/mnenie/arina-mordvinova-ekonomicheskaya-strategiya-kitaya-v-
tsentralnoy-azii-zadachi-instrumenty-rezultat/  
Müllerson, R. (2013). Central Asia: A Chessboard and Player in the New Great Game. 
New York: Routledge. 
Nau, H. (2003). Identity and the Balance of Power in Asia. In J.Ikenberry & 
M.Mastanduno (eds.), International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific. pp. 
213-234. New York: Columbia University. 
O’Loughlin, J., Tuathail, G., & Kolosov, V. A Risky. (2004). Westward Turn? Putin’s 9-
11 Script and Ordinary Russians. Europe-Asia Studies. Vol. 56, No. 1. (pp.3-34). 
Oliphant, C. (2013). Russia’s role and interests in Central Asia. SAFERWORLD. Briefing 
paper. Retrieved from http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=172941 
Paramonov, V., Strokov, A., & Stolpovskiy, O. (2008). Rossiya i Kitay v Tsentralnoy 
Azii: politikia, ekonomika i bezopasnost. [Russia and China in Central Asia: 
politics, economy and security]. Bishkek. 
Peyrouse, S. (2007). Economic Aspects of the Chinese-Central Asia Rapprochement. 
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Program. Retrieved from 
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/SilkRoadPapers/0709China-
Central_Asia.pdf  
Peyrouse, S. (2009). Central Asia’s growing partnership with China. EU-Central Asia 
Monitoring, Working paper 04. Retrieved from 
http://www.eucentralasia.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/Working_Papers/WP4-
EN.pdf  
Raballand, G., Andresy, A. (2007). Why should trade between Central Asia and China 
continue to expand? Asia-Europe Journal, 5: 235-252. DOI 10.1007/s10308-007-
0115-5 
Rumer, E. (2007). The United States and Central Asia: In Search of Strategy. In E.Rumer, 
D.Trenin & H.Zhao Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow and Beijing 
(pp. 18-71). Armonk, NY: ME.Shape. 
Rumer, E., Sokolsky, R., Stronsky, P. (2016). U.S. Policy Toward Central Asia 3.0. 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retreived from 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_259_Central_Asia_Final.pdf  
	 119 
Scobell, A., Ratner, E., Beckley, M. (2014). China’s Strategy Toward South and Central 
Asia: An Empty Fortress. RAND. Retrieved from 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR525/RAN
D_RR525.pdf  
Sheives, K. (2006). China Turns West: Beijing’s Contemporary Strategy Towards Central 
Asia. Pacific Affairs. Volume 79, No. 2, pp. 205-224. 
Stein, A. (2013). Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand Strategy. In R.Rosecrance 
&  A.Stein (eds.), Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, (pp. 3-21), Ithaca, N.Y: 
Cornell University Press. 
Swanström, N. (2007). China’s Role in Central Asia” Soft and Hard Power. Global 
Dialogue, Volume 9, No. 1-2. Retrieved from 
http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=402  
Swanström, N. (2011). China and Greater Central Asia: New Frontiers? Central Asia-
Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Program. Retrieved from 
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/SilkRoadPapers/2011_12_SRP_Swa
nstrom_China-Central-Asia.pdf 
Swanström, N. (2014). Sino-Russian Relations at the Start of the New Millennium in 
Central Asia and Beyond. Journal of Contemporary China. Volume 23, Issue 87, 
2014. DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2013.843911 
Trenin, D. (2007). Russia in Central Asia: Interests, Policies and, Prospects. In E.Rumer, 
D.Trenin & H.Zhao Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow and Beijing 
(pp. 75-131). Armonk, NY: ME.Shape. 
Tsygankov, A. (2012). Change and Continuity in Russia’s Foreign Policy. Russian 
Analytical Digest, No, 109. pp. 9-11. 
Tsygankov, A. (2013). Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National 
Identity (3rd edition). Lanham, MD: The Rowman & Littlefield. 
Tsygankov, A. (2014). Preserving Influence in a Changing World: Russia’s Grand 
Strategy. Problems of Post-Communism, Vol.58, No.1. DOI: 10.2753/PPC1075-
8216580203 
Walt, S. (1985). Alliance formation and the balance of world power. International 
Security, 9(4). pp.3-43. 
Waltz, K. (1979). The theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley. 
Weber, C. (2010). International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction, (3rd ed.), 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Weitz, R. (2014). The Customs Union and Eurasian Union: A Primer. In F.Starr & 
S.Cornell (eds.). Putin’s Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and its Discontents, 




Weitz, R. (2013). China’s Military Goals, Policy, Doctrine, and Capabilities in Central 
Asia. In S.Blank (ed.), Central Asia after 2014, pp. 81-113. Strategic Studies 
Institute. Retrieved from 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1175.pdf 
	 120 
Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University. 
Wendt, A. (1992).  Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics.  International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 391-425. 
Yin, R. (2014). Case Study Research: Design and Methods (5th edition). SAGE. 
Zaidah, Z. (2007). Case Study as Research Method. Jurnal Kemanusiaan No. 9. pp. 1-6. 
Zhao, H. (2007). Central Asia in China’s Diplomacy. In E.Rumer, D.Trenin & H.Zhao 
Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow and Beijing. pp. 137-208. Armonk, 
NY: ME.Shape. 
Zhao, H. (2016). Central Asian in China’s Strategic Thinking. In T.Fingar (ed.), The New 
Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the era of Reform, pp. 171-185. 
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 
Zimmerman, T. (2015). The New Silk Roads: China, the U.S., and the future of Central 
Asia. New York University, Center on International Cooperation. Retrieved from 
http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/zimmerman_new_silk_road_final_2.pdf 	
